Privacy Year in Review: Recent Developments in the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, and Other Acts Affecting Financial Privacy by Roach, Steven Robert & Schuerman, William R., Jr.
Privacy Year in Review: Recent Developments in
the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, Fair Credit
Reporting Act, and Other Acts Affecting
Financial Privacy
STEVEN ROBERT ROACH & WILLIAM R. SCHUERMAN, JR.
ABSTRACT
This article addresses current privacy issues that concern financial
information. The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act ("GLB Act') is the
most comprehensive federal financial privacy act. Federal case
law in 2004 helped to define the meaning of 'financial
institution," "affiliate," and "notice" under the GLB Act, along
with exploring whether it provides a private right of action. The
interaction of the GLB Act with state laws is reviewed through
examples from California, Vermont and Massachusetts. The
European Union Directive is also discussed
This article also explores the privacy issues arising under
the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA') and accurate credit
transaction acts. An introduction of these acts, including their
interactions with one another, is provided. Issues discussed are:
state laws and federal preemption, limitations on the usage of
credit reports, obligations for the users of credit reports, and the
difficulty of enforcing these acts. Further case law illustrates the
expanding protections for consumers who attempt to correct credit
errors by furnishers of credit information. These issues are
analyzed through current laws and federal and state cases. The
impacts on financial privacy of Section 326 of the Patriot Act and
the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act
("HIPAA') are also discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans are becoming increasingly concerned with their
privacy, and public opinion polls are nearly unanimous in finding
strong support among Americans favoring legal protections that ensure
the privacy of their personal information. A summary of recent public
opinion polls on privacy by the Electronic Privacy Information Center
identified several broad trends and reported consumer concerns
including:
* The authors are J.D. candidates at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, class of
2006. Steven Robert Roach, B.A., High Honors, The University of Michigan, 2002. William
R. Schuerman Jr., B.S., cum laude, Cornell University, 2003.
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Individuals should be in control of both initial collection of
data and data sharing; individuals want accountability and
security; individuals want comprehensive legislation, not
self-regulation; individuals value anonymity; individuals
object to web tracking, especially when personal information
is linked to the profile; individuals do not trust companies to
administer personal data and fear both private-sector and
government abuses of privacy; individuals engage in privacy
self-defense; individuals are unaware of prevalent tracking
methods; [and individuals desire] notice.'
One important area in which these concerns manifest themselves is the
area of financial privacy. Recent developments illustrate the tension
between balancing information sharing to provide an efficient financial
services industry and protecting the privacy of consumer information
and the rights of consumers. Financial institutions are realizing that
protecting privacy is good for a company's bottom line, and not
protecting it is no longer an option. However, as Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Alan Greenspan notes, "the free-flow of information
allows the market to adjust to meet consumers' needs," and regulation
in this area restricts the market's ability to respond to consumers'
needs for privacy. 2  The free-flow of financial information that is
essential for a market must be balanced with the public's concerns
with excessive information sharing.
Federal financial laws have attempted to work within these two
competing interests by supporting the sharing of information between
institutions while protecting consumer information through disclosure
and notice requirements in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLB Act").
The Fair and Accurate Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") and the
Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act ("FACT Act") attempt to
protect the consumer against legitimate and growing harms such as
identity theft. Section 326 of the USA PATRIOT Act was passed
after September 1 1th and provides stricter mechanisms to combat
money laundering domestically and abroad. Finally, financial
institutions such as banks are among the many organizations that need
to familiarize themselves with the new Health Information Portability
and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") regulations developed to help
' Electronic Privacy Information Center, Public Opinion on Privacy, available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/survey/ (last visited March 17, 2005) (quoting headers).
2 American Bar Association, Greenspan on the Free Flow ofInformation, available at
http://www.aba.comIndustry+Issues/GRPRGreenspan.htm (last visited April 3, 2005).
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promote a more economically efficient electronic claim process, and
protect the privacy of individually identifiable health information.
This paper will restrict its focus to these four primary areas and will
address recent case law, regulations, and statutes that affect the
financial privacy sector.
II. THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT
A. BACKGROUND
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLB Act"), signed into law by
President Clinton on November 12, 1999, contains the most
comprehensive financial privacy provisions of any federal legislation
ever enacted.3  The purpose of the GLB Act was "to enhance
competition in the financial services industry by providing a prudential
framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms, insurance
companies, and other financial service providers. ' 4 The Act attempts
to accomplish this purpose by eliminating barriers on affiliation
between banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other
financial service providers.5
The relevant privacy provisions from the GLB Act are found in
Title V (the Financial Privacy Law) and contain two separate privacy-
related subtitles.6  Subtitle A creates new substantive obligations
relating to the disclosure of customers' nonpublic personal information
by financial institutions to nonaffiliated third parties. 7 Under these
obligations, a financial institution is required to provide each customer
3 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in Titles 12
and 15 of the United States Code). For further discussion of the potential effects of GLBA,
see generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the US. Financial Services
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation and Increased Risks, 2002 U. I11. L. Rev.
215 (2002).
4 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-434 (1999); see also Julia C. Schiller, Informational Privacy v.
The Commercial Speech Doctrine: Can the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Provide Adequate
Privacy Protection?, 11 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 349,355 (2003).
5 Kyle Thomas Sammin, Any Port in a Storm: The Safe Harbor, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
and the Problem of Privacy in Financial Services, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 653, 666
(2004) (quoting JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 34, 443, 460
(3d ed.) (2001)).
6 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 (1999).
' See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (1999).
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with a clear statement describing the institution's policies and
practices with respect to the sharing of customer information with third
parties, and their procedures for protecting the security and
confidentiality of consumer information. 8 In addition, Subtitle A
requires that each financial institution provides its customers and
certain other consumers with notice offering a clear and conspicuous
opportunity to "opt out" of the disclosure of certain information to
nonaffiliated third parties prior to disclosure. 9 Subtitle B of Title V
establishes new federal criminal penalties relating to the fraudulent
obtainment of customer information from financial institutions.
10
Subtitle B was enacted by Congress in response to "information
brokers" who purportedly obtain customer information by engaging in
a variety of tactics with the purpose of defrauding customers and
financial institutions.
11
The above obligations of Subtitle A of Title V apply principally to
"financial institutions," defined as any institution "the business of
which is engaging in financial activities as described in section 4(k) of
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. "12 This broad definition, as
added by section 103 of the GLB Act, includes any entity engaging in
any of the activities identified as permissible for a financial holding
company or its nonbank affiliates, regardless of the entity's traditional
structural classification. 13  In addition, the GLB Act authorizes the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("FRB") to act as
an "umbrella regulator" in defining permissible activities for a
financial holding company or its nonbank affiliates. 14 Through this
authority, the FRB has issued regulations for financial holding
companies and nonbank affiliates that have expanded the definition of
8 L. Richard Fischer, Disclosure of Nonpublic Personal Information, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL
PRIVACY, 9.01 SUBTITLE A (A.S. Pratt & Sons 2004); see 15 U.S.C. §§ 6803(a), 6803(b)(1)
(1999).
9 Fischer, supra note 8, at 9.01 SUBTITLE A; see 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(1) (1999).
10 Fischer, supra note 8, at 1 9.02; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 6821-6827 (1999).
1 Fischer, supra note 8, at 9.02; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-74, pt. 1, at 103 (1999).
12 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(A)-(E) (2000); see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1956).
13 Id.
14 Sammin, supra note 5, at 667 (citing Lisa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and
Insurance: Before and After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 J. CORP. L. 723, 762 (2000)); see
also 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(5).
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"financial institutions" to include many traditionally non-financial
entities.1
5
The GLB Act operates by placing limits on financial institutions'
ability to disclose "nonpublic personal information" of customers.1 6
Section 509(4)(A) of the Financial Privacy Law defines "nonpublic
personal information" as any personally identifiable financial
information that is obtained by a financial institution from the
customer, from the institution's own transactions with the customer, or
through any third party source.17 In defining proper disclosure, the
GLB Act "adopted the basic rule of requiring an opt-out choice before
personal data could be shared with nonaffiliated third parties."' 8 The
"opt-out provision" must: (1) be clear and conspicuous; (2) accurately
explain the customer's right to "opt-out"; (3) inform the customer that
the institution may disclose nonpublic financial information to
nonaffiliated third parties; and (4) provide customers with reasonable
means by which to exercise their right to "opt-out."' 19 The Financial
Privacy Law further complicates the Act by distinguishing between the
terms "consumer" and "customer." A "consumer" is defined as an
individual who obtains financial products or services for a personal,
family, or household purpose from a financial institution.20  A
"customer" is defined as a consumer who has a continuing "customer
relationship" with the financial institution. 21 This differentiation is
important because a "customer" of a financial institution is always
entitled to receive a copy of the financial institution's privacy policy,
both at the time of establishing the customer relationship and annually
thereafter. A "consumer," on the other hand, is not covered by section
503 of the Financial Privacy Law and will receive "opt-out" rights
15 See Sammin, supra note 5, at 667 (providing examples of several non-traditional financial
institutions).
16 See 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4)(B) (1999).
17 Fischer, supra note 8, at 9.01[1][B]; see 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4)(A) (1999).
18 Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law, 86 MINN. L. REv.,
1263, 1268 (2002).
'9 See 15 U.S.C. § 6809.
2 15 U.S.C. § 6809(9).
21 See 12 C.F.R. § 40.3(i) (2000).
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only if the institution intends to disclose information relating to that
"consumer" to a nonaffiliated third party. 22
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is a congressional attempt to
facilitate the efficient sharing of information throughout the financial
services industry. Congress eliminated "the barriers on affiliation
between banks, insurance, and securities industries," in an attempt to
provide one-stop shopping for financial services, reducing costs, and
creating more efficient operations. 23 The GLB Act balances these
efficiencies with customers' rights to privacy by requiring financial
institutions to comply with the notice and opt-out provisions discussed
above. Through these requirements, the GLB Act attempts to create
an efficient compromise between the benefits of information, sharing
and the personal privacy rights of customers. Although considered by
many as a significant advance in financial privacy law, the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act played a controversial role in 2004, with specific
issues concerning: (1) the proper interpretation of so-called "terms of
art" on the federal level; (2) the Act's notice requirement; (3) state
preemption issues, especially pertaining to interaction with the Fair
Credit Recording Act; (4) the proper enforcement of the Act; and (5)
compliance with the European Union's Privacy Directive.
B. FEDERAL CASE LAW SUMMARY
During 2004, federal case law concerning the application and
enforcement of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act under federal law
focused on: (1) the proper interpretation of terms of art such as
"financial institutions" and "affiliate;" (2) the notice requirement; (3)
the availability of a private right of action under the GLB Act; and (4)
state preemption issues concerning possible conflicts in law.
1. DEFINING A "FINANCIAL INSTITUTION"
Over the past year, federal courts have been asked to define further
"financial institutions" under the GLB Act, and to rule explicitly on
the status of several specific entities. After unsuccessfully attempting
to obtain a statement from the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"),
two state bar associations challenged the FTC's determination that
attorneys engaging in certain financial activities fall within the Act's
22 Fischer, supra note 8, at 9.01[2]; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 6803(a), 6802(b).
23 Schiller, supra note 4, at 355.
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definition of financial institutions.24  In New York State Bar
Association v. FTC, the plaintiff bar association brought an action
following "report[s] in the professional and trade regulation press"
indicating that the FTC had decided that attorneys engaged in certain
"financial activities" as part of their legal practice would be subject to
25the GLB Act. In this action, the bar association was seeking adeclaratory judgment that
(1) the FTC's decision that attorneys engaged in certain
"financial activities" as part of their practice of law are
covered by the [GLB Act] is beyond the FTC's statutory
authority; (2) the FTC's decision that attorneys engaged in
certain "financial activities" as part of their practice of law
are covered by the [GLB Act] is arbitrary and capricious
agency action; and (3) the FTC's refusal to grant attorneys
engaged in the practice of law an exemption from the [GLB
Act] also constitutes arbitrary and capricious agency
action.26
The D.C. district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs,
citing the reasons set forth by the court in its August 11, 2003
Memorandum Opinion.27  The district court, citing the 2003
memorandum opinion, found it was "unable to conclude as a matter of
law that Congress intended for the [GLB Act's] privacy provisions to
apply to attorneys who provide legal services in the fields of real estate
settlement, tax-planning[,] and tax-preparation." 28 The court stated
that the conclusion was "compelled by the plain language, the
underlying purpose, and the legislative history of the [GLB Act],
which all indicate that it does not appear that Cong"ess intended for
attorneys to be considered 'financial institutions.' ' As for the bar
24 See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n v. FTC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7698 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2004); see
also N.Y. State Bar Ass'n v. FTC, 276 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D.D.C. 2003).
25 N. Y. State Bar Ass 'n, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7698, at *2 (citing N.Y. State Bar Ass'n
Compl., at 37).
26 Id. at *4, 5.
27 N. Y. State Bar Ass "n, 276 F. Supp. 2d 110.
28 N. Y. State Bar Ass 'n, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7698, at *7 (discussing N. Y State Bar, 276 F.
Supp. 2d at 136).
29 Id. at *8.
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association's "arbitrary and capricious" claims, the court again cited
the 2003 memorandum opinion, concluding, "[t]here is nothing else in
the record that indicates that the FTC engaged in any type of reasoned
decisionmaking, confirming the Court's belief that the FTC acted in an
'arbitrary and capricious' manner" 30 and, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A), "the FTC's interpretation that attorneys are subject to the




In Texas, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Texas determined whether "financial institutions" include software
companies. 32 Here, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss,
contending that the plaintiff software company violated the GLB Act
by including defendants' personal credit card numbers and signatures
in exhibits to the original complaint. 33 The Texas district court looked
to the Code of Federal Regulations for insight, finding:
[F]inancial institutions include, but are not limited to[,]
mortgage lenders, "pay day" lenders, finance companies,
mortgage brokers, account services, check cashers, wire
transferors, travel agencies operated in connection with
financial services, collecting agencies, credit counselors and
other financial advisors, tax preparation firms, non-federally
insured credit unions, and investment advisors that are not
required to register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
34
The court then compared these "financial activities" to the activities
conducted by Lacerte, finding that the software company appears not
to have "engaged in any of the activities above., 35 The court issued a
narrow holding, however, stating only that "even if Lacerte were a
financial institution, the Act does not provide a private right of action,"
30Id. at *11.
31 Id. at *12.
32 Lacerte Software Corp. v. Prof I Tax Servs. L.L.C., 2004 WL 180321 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6,
2004).
3 3 1d at *1.
34 Id. (citing 16 C.F.R. § 313.1(b)).
31 Id. at *2.
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In Maryland, the FTC sued AmeriDebt for violations of the GLB
Act's disclosure requirements, alleging that AmeriDebt, while
operating under the disguise of a non-profit credit counseling service,
defrauded consumers through a debt repayment plan.37 In response,
AmeriDebt denied it was a "financial institution," claiming it was
exempt from the Act's requirements. 38 The court found that the Act
authorizes the FTC and other federal agencies to promote polices and
issue regulations necessary to carry out the stated purpose of the GLB
Act.39 The court discovered that the preamble to the FTC's final rule
on the privacy of customer financial information states that "the term
'financial institutions' is defined 'very broadly' under the [GLB Act]
and includes several entities not traditionally recognized as financial
institutions.' '40 The court discussed the provision cited above in the
Lacerte case, finding that the final rule explicitly includes a "credit
counseling service" as an example of a financial institution. 41 In
addition to citing AmeriDebt's practice as a self-described "credit
counseling service," the court looked at AmeriDebt's specific
practices, concluding AmeriDebt is a "financial institution" under the
GLB Act.42 The Maryland district court went a step further, citing
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC and concluding, "insofar as there may
be ambiguity in the term 'financial institution,' the Commission's
interpretation of the definition to embrace credit counseling services is
entitled to the Court's deference.
' 43
3 6 Id.
37 FTC v. AmeriDebt, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 2d 451, 453 (D. Md. 2004).
38 Id. at 465.
9 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6804(a)(1)).
4 0 I d. at 457 (discussing 65 Fed. Reg. 33646, 33647 & 33658 (May 24, 2000)).
41Id. at 458 (quoting 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(k)(2)(xii); "an investment advisory company and a
credit counseling service are each financial institutions because providing financial and
investment advisory services are financial activities referenced in 4(k)(4)(C)" of the Bank
Holding Company Act).
42 See FTC v. AmeriDebt, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 2d, at 461-62 (practices include brokering
consumer's credit with various creditors, collecting payments from consumer, and transferring
payments received to end creditors).
43 Id. at 462 (discussing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778
(1984)).
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2. DEFINING "AFFILIATE"
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act defined the term "affiliate" to mean
"any company that controls, is controlled by, or is under common
control with another company." 44 The GLB Act operates to enhance
the ability of affiliated companies to share information more
efficiently and effectively for cross-marketing Durmoses.45 Although
"affiliates" clearly create operating efficiencies for financial
institutions, there are privacv concerns inherent in granting an entity
"affiliate" nower and therefore, federal courts are asked to determine
whether a subsidiary constitutes an "affiliate" under the GLB Act.
In Wachovia Bank v. Burke, the federal district court of
Connecticut determined whether the National Bank Act 4 6 and
regulations promulgated by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency ("OCC") preempt Connecticut state licensing statutes.47
Specifically, Wachovia Bank claimed that the National Bank Act
created "a system by which so-called 'national' banks would receive a
federal charter and would be free from state 'visitorial' power except
as permitted by law or court order., 48 Commissioner Burke conceded
that he could not enforce the statutes against Wachovia Bank itself, but
asserted his authority to regulate Wachovia Mortgage on the ground
that it is a subsidiary of a "national bank. 4 9 In determining whether
Wachovia Mortgage was a subsidiary, the court turned to the language
of the GLB Act, finding "Congress singled out only financial
subsidiaries, not operating subsidiaries, for treatment as national bank
affiliates. ' 50 From this language, the court concluded that because the
GLB Act authorized financial subsidiaries to conduct certain non-
national bank functions formally forbidden, Congress made a decision
to treat these financial entities as "affiliates" subject to state
regulation. 51 Essentially, the court stated that national banks were able
44 15 U.S.C. § 6809(6).
45 See Fischer, supra note 8, at 9.01[1][C].
46 National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 21 et. seq.
47 Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 319 F. Supp. 2d 275, 277 (2004).
48 Id. at 278; see 12 U.S.C. § 484.
49 See Wachovia Bank, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
50 1d. at 284 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 371c(e)(2)).
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to engage in previously forbidden, non-commercial bank functions
through their affiliates, and that these "financial" affiliates could be
subject to state regulation.52
3. THE "NOTICE" REQUIREMENT
The GLB Act imposes an obligation on financial institutions to
disclose their privacy policies to customers, both "[a]t the time of
establishing a customer relationship" and on an annual basis so long as
that customer maintains a relationship with the institution. 3 The Act
also requires that financial institutions provide customers with notice
and the opportunity to opt-out of the sharing of information with
nonaffiliated third parties.54  Under section 503 of the Financial
Privacy Law, privacy policy notices must "'convey information that is
critical to [a person's] decision making' regarding his personal data."55
Senator Gramm stated that Congress intended the disclosure
requirement to enable consumers to make educated choices among
financial institutions that offer different privacy policies or disclosure
practices. 56 The GLB Act requires that these privacy notices and the
disclosure of opt-out provisions be made "clearly and
conspicuously., 57 Instead of being "clear and conspicuous," however,
the typical privacy notice offered by financial institutions is difficult to
understand and is written in a manner that makes it difficult to exercise
the option to-opt out.58  Explanations of how to opt-out typically
appear at the end of the privacy notice and are often never read and
executed by customers. 59
51 Id
52 See id.
13 15 U.S.C. § 6803(a).
14 15 U.S.C. § 6802.
55 Sammin, supra note 5, at 663-64 (quoting Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 1219, 1225 (2002)).
56 145 CONG. REc. S13785-13786 (daily ed. November 3, 1999) (Statement of Sen. Gramm).
"7 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(1)(A).
58 Schiller, supra note 4, at 362; see Janger, supra note 55, at 1230-32.
2005]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
In response to these concerns, the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") issued an "interagencv proposal to consider
alternative forms of privacy notices under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act.",60  In this proposal, various agencies61 requested comment on
whether the regulations that implement sections 502 and 503 of the
GLB Act should be amended to allow or require financial institutions
to provide alternative types of privacy notices that would be easier for
consumers to understand (short-form notices 62).63 In this proposal, the
agencies applauded efforts already made by consumer advocates and
financial institutions to formulate short, consumer-friendly notices that
accompany the longer, legally mandated notices under the GLB Act.
64
The agencies believed that the best approach to addressing the "notice"
problem was to solicit comments from financial institutions on the
"wide range of issues associated with the format, elements, and
,,65language used in privacv notices.
The agencies' proposal focuses on the possible need for a short
privacv notice that will improve the readability and usefulness of
privacy notices.66 The proposal identifies five possible approaches to
simplify privacy notices:
60 Interagency Proposal to Consider Alternative Forms of Privacy Notices Under the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, 68 Fed. Reg. 75164 (proposed Dec. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-48966.pdf (interagency proposal between the financial
privacy law enforcement "Agencies": the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of
Thrift Supervision, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, National Credit Union Administration, Federal Trade Commission, Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission).
61 "Agencies" include: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift
Supervision, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
National Credit Union Administration, Federal Trade Commission, Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
62 For examples of "short-form" opt-out notices: see Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Addendum
to Fact Sheet 24(a), Sample Opt-Out Letters, Short Form, available at
http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs24a-formletter.htm (last viewed February 15, 2005), The
University of Texas at Arlington, Notice of Privacy Practices (Short Form), available at
http://www.uta.edu/healthservices/Notice%20oP/20Privacy/ 20Practices.pdf (last viewed
February 15, 2005).
63 See Interagency Proposal to Consider Alternative Forms of Privacy Notices Under the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 68 Fed. Reg. at 75164.
64Id. at 75166.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 75167.
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(1) the development of a specific format and standardized
language for a short notice that highlights key elements of an
institution's privacy policy;
(2) the development of a short notice with a specific format
and standardized language designed to address all of the
relevant elements listed in the GLB Act and the privacy rule;
(3) establishing a standardized format for notices, but still
allowing financial institutions to provide their own
descriptions of their privacy policies and practices;
(4) prescribing standardized language that financial
institutions would use to design their own, specific notice
without a format specified by the privacy rule; or
(5) focusing attention on the consumer's right to opt-out of
disclosures available under the institution's privacy
policies.67
Although each of the policies would require regulatory implementation
by the agencies, the policies clearly differ as to the agencies' actual
involvement in formulating each institution's specific "short form"
policy. For example, the second approach requires that all institutions
develop a specific format using standardized language that addresses
all of the relevant elements of the GLB Act.68 Under this approach,
privacy notices from all institutions would be very similar and could
be ill suited to meet each institution's actual privacy concerns. On the
other hand, the fourth approach, which allows institutions to develop
their own privacy policy within the boundaries created by standardized
language, would allow each institution to formulate policies
specifically suited for its organization, while still providing consumers
with the ability to compare institutions through standardized
language.69
67 Id.
68 Interagency Proposal to Consider Alternative Forms of Privacy Notices Under the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, 68 Fed. Reg. at 75167.
69 id
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During 2004, the agencies received numerous responses to their
request for information concerning the wide range of issues associated
with the format, elements, and language to use in future privacy
notices. 70 The agencies have yet to enter a final rule stating the official
changes to GLB Act privacy notices. However, the agencies clearly
favor the implementation of consumer-friendly notice requirements
that efficiently describe the institution's privacy policies in a simple
fashion, while meeting all the legal requirements for notice.
7 1
4. PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
During 2004, courts again held that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
"does not provide a private right of action for a financial institution's
violation of the [GLB Act's] privacy provisions,57 2 with the Borninski
and Lacerte courts citing the New York district court case of Menton
v. Experian Corporation73 as authority. In Menton, the court found
that 15 U.S.C. § 6805(a) clearly restricted the GLB Act to government
action and did not provide for a private right of action.
74
C. INTERACTION WITH STATE LAWS
Over the past year, developments in the interaction between the
GLB Act and state laws focused on state law preemption issues and
the judicial process exception to the disclosure of nonpublic personal
70 See Comment #5, America's Health Insurance Plans (Mar. 26, 2004) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/glbaltprivacynotices/03-31992-0005.pdf (last viewed
February 15, 2005); Comment #10 Mary J. Culnan, Ph.D., Comments on Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, (Mar. 29, 2004) available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
glbaltprivacynotices/03-31992-0010.pdf (last viewed February 16, 2005); Comment #11,
Household Automotive Finance Corporation (Mar. 29, 2004) available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/comments/glbaltprivacynotices/03-31992-0011 .pdf.
71 See Interagency Proposal to Consider Alternative Forms of Privacy Notices Under the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 68 Fed. Reg. at 75166.
72 Borninski v. Williamson, 2004 WL 433746, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2004); see also
Lacerte Software Corp., 2004 WL 180321, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2004).
73 Menton v. Experian Corp., 2003 WL 21692829, at *3 (S.D. N.Y. Jul. 21, 2003).
74 See id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6805(a))("This subchapter and the regulations prescribed
thereunder shall be enforced by the Federal functional regulators, the State insurance
authorities, and the Federal Trade Commission with respect to the financial institutions and
other persons subject to their jurisdiction...").
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information. State law preemption issues were raised in California,75
76 77Massachusetts,76 and Vermont. The judicial process exception was
invoked by state courts in Alabama 78 and West Virginia 7 9 as a means
of permitting state courts to require the disclosure of nonpublic
personal information during the litigation process.
1. STATE PREEMPTION ISSUES - THE CALIFORNIA PRIVACY LAW
The California Information Privacy Act ("California Privacy
Law") became operative on July 1, 2004.80 The California Privacy
Law affords Californians greater protection over their personal
financial information than those provided by the GLB Act.81  The
California Privacy Law and the GLB Act do not share the same
exceptions from disclosure restrictions, nor apply exceptions to the
same entities. 82 Further complicating matters is the effect of the Bank
ofAmerica v. City of Daly City decision, 83 holding that local California
ordinances regarding affiliate sharing of nonpublic personal
information are preempted by the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA"). 84 The Bank of America decision raised the question that
the California Privacy Law may also be preempted by federal law.
75 See Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer, 2004 WL 1490432 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2004); see also
Bank of Am. v. City of Daly City, Cal, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
76 See Mass. Bankers Ass'n v. Bowler, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 348 (D. Mass. Jan. 10, 2005) (slip
copy).
77 See Am. Council of Life Insurers v. Vt. Dep't of Banking, 2004 WL 578737 (Vt. Super.
Feb. 12, 2004).
78 See exparte Nat'l W. Life Ins. Co. v. Farmer, 2004 WL 2260308 (Ala. Oct. 8, 2004); Ex
parte Mutual Say. Life Ins. Co., 2004 Ala. LEXIS 262 (Ala. Oct. 8, 2004).
79 See Martino v. Barnett, 215 W.Va. 123, 595 S.E.2d 65 (2004).
80 CAL. FIN. CODE § 4060 (West 2004).
8" Elizabeth A. Huber & Elena A. Lovoy, Update on State Consumer Financial Privacy
Legislation and Regulation, 59 Bus. LAW. 1227, 1228 (2004).
82 Id.
83 See Am. Bankers Ass 'n, 2004 WL 1490432, at *5 (stating that the Bank of America decision
has been vacated by the Ninth Circuit and lacks precedential authority); see generally Bank of
Am., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1118.
8Bank ofAm., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1128-29.
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In response to the Bank of America holding, three financial
services trade associations brought a collective action, asking the court
to declare the affiliate sharing provision of the California Privacy Law
void and unenforceable. The trade associations claimed it was
expressly preempted by the FCRA.85  In particular, the plaintiffs
sought to overturn the California Privacy Law's restrictions on the
dissemination of personal financial information between affiliated
business institutions. 86 In its defense, the state of California contended
that passage of the California Privacy Law was proper "[b]ecause §
6807(b) of the [GLB Act] expressly allows states to enact consumer
protection statutes providing greater privacy protection." 87  In
addressing the issue, the California district court looked at the stated
purpose of the FCRA and concluded that the "only reasonable reading
of the FCRA preemption provision is that it prevents states from
enacting laws that 8prohibit or restrict the sharing of consumer reports
among affiliates."8  The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
the FCRA preemption provision broadly preempted all state laws
regulating information sharing by affiliates.89 The California district
court then looked to the GLB Act for support, finding that the Act
encompassed the general sharing of consumer information between
affiliates.90  In applying the GLB Act to the "affiliate sharing
provisions," the court first examined the legislative history of the Act,
finding that Congress intended to allow more rigorous state
regulation.91 Based on this finding, the California district court held
that Congress clearly "intended that states to be afforded the right to
regulate consumer financial privacy on behalf of their citizens in
adopting statutes more protective in that regard than the provisions of
the [GLB Act]."92
85 Am. Bankers Ass'n, 2004 WL 1490432, at *1.
86 Id.
87Id. at *2.
8 Id. at *4.
89 Id.
90Am. Bankers Ass'n, 2004 WL 1490432, at *5.
91 See id. (citing a Conference Report that confirms under the GLB Act, "States can continue





On June 30, 2004, the California district court held that the
California Privacy Law was not preempted by the FCRA because the
limitations on the sharing of personal financial information were
specifically discussed in the GLB Act, which "allow[ed] states to enact
more stringent privacy regulations." 93 Plaintiffs immediately appealed
the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. In response to the appeal, numerous financial institutions and
privacy groups submitted briefs to the Ninth Circuit in support of both
parties. On August 11, 2004, the federal agencies ("Agencies")
responsible for enforcing federal financial privacy laws94 filed an
amicus curiae brief in support of American Bankers Association.95
The Agencies' brief looked to the language of the FCRA, as amended
by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction ("FACT") Act, and
argued that "[n]othing in the text of FCRA preemption provision at
issue even hints that its scope is limited only to state laws regulating
consumer reports. '96  The Agencies' brief also highlighted the
language and legislative history of the FACT Act, arguing that it
unambiguously supported the conclusion that the FCRA preemption
provision, as amended by the FACT Act, was intended to preempt
state laws limiting the sharing of information among all affiliates, not
just state laws dealing with "consumer reports." 97
The appellees, the State of California, et al, continued to argue that
the FCRA is limited to "consumer reports" as defined by section
1681a(d)(1) of the statute. 98  In support, the state presented specific
textual evidence it claimed establishes that neither the FCRA nor the
9' Id. at *6.
94 Agencies include: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision,
Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit
Union Administration, Federal Trade Commission, Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
95 Amicus Curiae Brief of Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift
Supervision, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
National Credit Union Administration, Federal Trade Commission, Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of Appellants
American Bankers Association, et al., (filed Aug. 11, 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/briefs/lockyer.pdf.
96 1d. at 19.
97 1d. at 20.
98 Brief of Appellees California Attorney General Bill Lockyer et al., Am. Bankers Ass'n v.
Lockyer, 2004 WL 2606248, at 39 (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 2004)(Nos. 04-16334, 04-16560).
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FACT Act demonstrated that Congress intended to establish uniform
national standards with respect to all affiliate sharing.99 Specifically,
California cited the strong presumption against preemption where a
state exercised its historic police power to protect consumers, while
also pointing to the FCRA exclusion clause in the GLB Act for
supportive textual evidence. 00 The state urged that the court look to
the "clear and unequivocal expression of congressional intent" found
in the GLB Act, where "Congress explicitly preserved the right of
states to enact more protective laws."''
1
While the Ninth Circuit has yet to hear the case on appeal, these
"affirmative consent" rules are in place in a number of states, and
many more states are considering adding similar requirements. 02 The
first courts to address federal challenges to state privacy legislation
have upheld the opt-in requirement as permissible.'0 3  All courts,
including the Ninth Circuit, have recognized that the GLB Act allows
for states to enact privacy legislation of a higher standard than the
federal standard. 10 4 Therefore, it appears the Ninth Circuit's decision
will focus on the proper interpretation of the FCRA's preemption
provision and whether the provision is intended to preempt state laws
limiting the sharing of information among all affiliates, or only
affiliates dealing with consumer reports.
2. STATE PREEMPTION ISSUES - MASSACHUSETTS AND VERMONT
In May 2000, the Massachusetts Bankers Association, Inc.
("MBA") requested the opinion of the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency ("OCC"), the primary regulator of federally chartered banks,
on whether the GLB Act preempted certain provisions of the
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act Relative to the Sale of
99 Id. at 34.
'oj Id. at 70-71.
102 Christopher Wolf, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Current Developments 2004, 789
PLI/PAT 715, 727 (2004).
103 Am. Council of Life Insurers v. Vt. Dep't of Banking, 2004 WL 578737 (Vt. Super. Feb.
12, 2004).
104 See Am. Bankers Ass 'n, supra note 75.
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Insurance by Banks.'0 5 The OCC responded that the provisions were
preempted by federal law.' 06  Thereafter, pursuant to
15 U.S.C. § 6714(a), the Massachusetts Commissioners of Insurance
and Banks and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts sought review in
the First Circuit Court of Appeals of the "regulatory conflict" resulting
from the OCC opinion. 107 After review, the First Circuit dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction because the court found there was no
regulatory conflict. 1
08
In response to this ruling, MBA and other Massachusetts banks
brought a collective action challenging four provisions of
Massachusetts law, which they labeled as the Referral Prohibition,
09
the Referral Fee Prohibition 'm the Waiting Period Restriction,"' and
the Separation Restriction. MBA argued that the four challenged
provisions were preempted by the GLB Act, pointing specifically to
section 6701(d)(2)(A) of Title 15 of the United States Code, which
states: "no State may, by statute, regulation, order, interpretation, or
other action, prevent or significantly interfere ... with an affiliate or
other person, in any insurance sales, solicitation, or cross marketing
activity.""13 Upon review, the court stated that the determinative issue
was "whether any of the challenged provisions 'prevent or
105 Mass. Bankers Ass'n v. Bowler, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 348, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 10, 2005)
(slip copy).
106 Id. at *3.
107 id.
108 Bowler v. Hawke, 320 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 2003).
109 See Mass.Bankers Ass 'n, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 348, at *4 (the Referral Provision "allows
officers, tellers, and other bank employees who are not licensed insurances agents to refer a
bank customer to a licensed insurance agent only when the customer inquires about
insurance").
"
0 See id. at *5 (the Referral Fee Prohibition "forbids banks from paying their employees from
making the referrals to their insurance agents").
1"' See id. (restriction which allows banks to solicit insurance sales to loan applicants only
after the application for the extension of credit is approved and all necessary disclosures are
communicated to and acknowledged by applicant in writing).
112 See id. (requires that insurance solicitations be conducted in a physically separate area of
bank).
"' Id. at *6, 7 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(A)).
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significantly interfere' with the ability of banks to sell, solicit, or cross
market insurance." ' 1 4  Applying this standard, the court found that
each of the Massachusetts laws challenged seriously "impedes
plaintiffs' [Massachusetts banks] ability to solicit, cross market and
sell insurance products" and are preempted by the GLB Act."l 5 In a
final statement, the court also concluded that its decision was based on
deference to the GLB Act and not the 2000 OCC opinion. 116
In November 2001, the Vermont Department of Banking,
Insurance, Securities, and Healthcare Administration ("BISHCA")
created an "opt-in" system for the disclosure of nonpublic financial
and health information by licensees." 7 In response to this regulation,
five insurance trade organizations subject to the new Vermont
Regulation sought a declaratory judgment invalidating the Regulation,
arguing that it fell outside BISHCA's statutory authority and violated
constitutional protections. 118 The court looked to the GLB Act for
guidance, finding that the GLB Act's opt-out and related privacy
provisions set a floor for consumer protection, superceding state laws
except insofar as they provide greater protection. 19 In applying the
GLB Act in light of the Vermont Regulation, the court found that the
opt-in provision of the Regulation and the opt-out provision of the
GLB Act both served the same substantial interests of protecting
consumer's privacy. 12  The court held that because the Vermont
Regulation provided greater privacy protection than the parallel GLB
provision, the Regulation was not superceded and was therefore
1 4 Mass. Bankers Ass 'n, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 348, at *7, 8.
'Id. at *12, 13.
116 Id. at *13.
117 See Am. Council of Life Insurers v. Vt. Dep't of Banking, 2004 WL 578737, at *1 (Vt.
Super., Feb. 12, 2004); see also William A. Darr, Commissioner of Illinois Office of Banks
and Real Estate, letter to FTC (July 16, 2001); available at http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/
glbact/illinoispetition.pdf (letter seeking preemption determination on a Illinois statute that
provides customers with an "opt-in" provision, no response as of Feb. 15, 2005).
118 Am. Council ofLife Insurers, 2004 WL 578737, at *1.
"9 Id. at *2.
120 Id. at *6.
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enforceable so long as the opt-in strategy did not violate plaintiffs'
constitutional rights.
121
3. THE JUDICIAL PROCESS EXCEPTION
During 2004, several states addressed the issue of whether the
disclosure of "nonpublic personal financial" information by financial
institutions during the discovery process was a violation of the GLB
Act. In both Alabama and West Virginia, state supreme courts held
that the GLB Act permited financial institutions to disclose a
customer's nonpublic personal financial information to comply with a
discovery request in a state action.
In Ex parte Mutual Savings Life Insurance Company, the Supreme
Court of Alabama held that the trial court was correct in ordering
Mutual Savings to "disclose its customers' nonpublic personal
information without providing notice to those customers engaging in
the opt-out requirement.' ' 122  The court found Congress created an
exception applicable to situations where "the trial court orders the
disclosure of a customer's nonpublic personal information during
discovery in a civil action."' 123 The court concluded by stating that
courts "should also issue a comprehensive protective order to guard
the customers' privacy.'
124
In a similar case, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
concluded that "the [GLB Act] and the Privacy Rule [FTC's final rule]
allow the use of any judicial process expressly authorized by statute or
court rule, whether by way of discovery or for any other purpose
expressly authorized by law," to obtain relevant information." The
court chose to extend the "judicial process exception" past
121 See id. at *6-7 (court finds that the Regulation's opt-in strategy does not violate Plaintiffs'
commercial speech rights).
122 Exparte Mutual Savings Life Ins. Co., 2004 Ala. LEXIS 262, at *14-15 (Ala., Oct. 8,
2004); see also Exparte Nat'l W. Life Ins. Co., 2004 WL 2260308 (Ala., Oct. 8, 2004).
123 Exparte Mutual Savings Life Ins. Co., 2004 Ala. LEXIS 262, at * 14 (The court bases its
decision on a finding that a plain reading of the GLB Act revealed that "the phrase 'to respond
to judicial process' is independent from the phrase 'to respond to... government regulatory
authorities..."' Through this finding, the court concluded that the "to respond to judicial
process" provision provides an exception for situations where a party discloses information
pursuant to a court order).
124 Id. at *15-16.
125 See Martino, 595 S.E. 2d at 72.
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"discovery," stating "no such limitation to application of the term
'judicial process' appears in the [GLB Act] exception."'126 Although
the West Virginia Court seemingly extended the exception to all parts
of the trial process, the court remained mindful of the purposes of the
GLB Act, instructing that it was important to balance the strong
interests involved in protecting the privacy of consumers' financial
information against the importance of full disclosure of any matter that
is relevant to the claim or defense of any party. 127 To this end, the
West Virginia Court stated that trial courts have a duty to balance
these interests and issue protective orders which "limit access to
necessary information.
128
Over the past year, state courts have interpreted the language of the
GLB Act to provide an explicit "judicial process" exception that
provides state courts with the authority to order financial institutions to
disclose customers' nonpublic personal financial information, in order
to comply with discovery requests in state actions. However, these
decisions also recognized the importance of the GLB Act's privacy
protection provisions and have generally required that courts issue
comprehensive protective orders to guard against abuse and misuse of
customers' private information.
D. HOT ToPIcs CONCERNING GLB ACT
1. STATE PREEMPTION ISSUES - CALIFORNIA PRIVACY LAW
The Ninth Circuit has yet to hear the American Bankers
Association case on appeal from the eastern district of California
holding that the California Privacy Law was not preempted by the Fair
Credit Recording Act. In this case, the California district court
concluded that the FCRA's regulatory power was limited to affiliates
dealing with "consumer reports" and that the limitations on the sharing
of personal financial information found in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act allowed states to enact more stringent privacy regulations. 1
29
These types of "affinmative consent" rules are already in place in a




129AM. Bankers Ass'n, 2004 WL 1490432, at *6.
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requirements.1 30 The first courts to address federal challenges to state
privacy legislation have upheld the opt-in requirements as permissible
under both the FCRA and the GLB Act.131 All jurisdictions, including
the Ninth Circuit, recognize that the GLB Act allows for states to enact
privacy legislation of a higher standard than the federal standard. 132
Therefore, it appears the Ninth Circuit's decision will focus on the
proper interpretation of the FCRA's preemption provision and whether
the provision is intended preempt state laws limiting the sharing of
information among all affiliates, or just affiliates dealing with
consumer reports.
2. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S PRIVACY DIRECTIVE
The United States and the European Union devised a Safe Harbor
Agreement 133 to facilitate trade between the groups while not
compromising on data privacy following the enactment of the
European Union's Privacy Directive in 1998. 134 The E.U. deemed the
GLB Act insufficient to meet the requirements of the Safe Harbor
Agreement13 5 citing a lack of customer "access" and "opt-in"
provisions. Negotiations are at a standstill, with U.S. negotiators
arguing that Europeans should accept the GLB Act as adequate
protection, and E.U. negotiators stating that their position is "not
something to be negotiated.' ' 136 This refusal to compromise has left
financial services under a standstill agreement where no enforcement
130 Christopher Wolf, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Current Developments 2004, 789
PLI/PAT 715, 727 (2004); see also Mark E. Budnitz, Consumer Privacy in Electronic
Commerce: As the Millennium Approached, Minnesota Attacked, Regulators Refrained, and
Congress Compromised, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 821, 883 (2000).
131 Am. Council of Life Insurers, 2004 WL 578737 (Vt. Super. Feb. 12, 2004).
132 See Am. Bankers Ass'n, 2004 WL 1490432, at *5 (citing a Conference Report that confirms
under the GLB Act, "States can continue to enact legislation of a higher standard than the
Federal standard;" 145 Cong. Rec. S13914 (Nov. 4, 1999)).
133 The Safe Harbor Agreement is a comprehensive data sharing privacy policy that focuses on
seven principles: (1) notice, (2) choice, (3) onward transfer, (4) security, (5) data integrity, (6)
access, and (7) enforcement; see Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to
European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,667-45,668 (July 24, 2000).
134 Sammin, supra note 5.
135 Id. at 654, 664.
116 Id. at 654.
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action will be taken so long as "the U.S. and E.U. officials continue
their 'good faith' negotiations."'
137
The recent judicial enforcement of state statutes and regulations
that supercede the minimum requirements of the GLB Act may help
strengthen the United States' position in arguing that the GLB Act
meets the requirements of the Safe Harbor Provision. For example,
states such as California 138 and Vermont, 139 have enacted state
legislation increasing privacy restrictions for affiliate sharing and
providing customers with the opportunity to "opt-in" to disclosure
notices. These statutes appear to meet many of the E.U.'s "sticking
points" with the GLB Act and may help the E.U. and the U.S. work
toward a compromise.
E. GRAMM-LEACH BLILEY ACT AND THE FuTuRE
Under current trends, the continued enactment of privacy statutes
by state legislatures and subsequent certification by federal courts will
lead to an erosion of the foundations of the GLB Act. However, this
erosion may be necessary to ensure the protection of American
citizens' nonpublic personal information. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act was a congressional attempt to facilitate the efficient and open
sharing of consumer information throughout the financial services
industry. In eliminating "the barriers on affiliation between banks,
insurance, and securities industries," Congress hoped that "one-stop"
shopping for financial services could generate efficiencies in the
industry, thereby reducing transaction costs for institutions and
increasing vrofitabilitv.140  The GLB Act attempts to balance these
efficiencies with customers' rights to privacy by reauiring financial
institutions to comolv with the notice and opt-out disclosure
provisions. The "affiliate sharing" and "opt-out" Drovisions are
essential to cost-efficient sharing of information among integrated
137 Id. (citing Kerry A. Kearney & P. Gavin Eastgate, Financial Services Should Meet Privacy
Standards, LEGAmedia, Nov. 2000 (inaccessible website)).
138 See CAL. FiN. CODE § 4060 (West 2004) (affords Californian's greater protection over their
personal financial information than those provided by the GLB Act).
139 Vermont Department of Banking, Insurance, Securities, and Healthcare Administration
Regulation IH-2001 -01, Nov. 17, 2001 (creating an "opt-in" system for the disclosure of
nonpublic financial and health information); see also Am. Council of Life Insurers, 2004 WL
578737 at *1.
140 Schiller, supra note 4, at 355.
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financial services companies, and have generated the most controversy
in states attempting to provide greater rotection. Under the GLB Act.
nonpublic Personal information may be shared among all affiliates,
once the consumer has received notice indicating such information
may be disclosed and has chosen not to ont for nondisclosure. Citing
to the GLB Act's provision that exnresslv allows states to enact
consumer protections statutes providing greater p~rivacv protection.
states have responded bv enacting provisions that require "opt-in"
disclosure and place greater restrictions on affiliate sharing.
State "affiliate sharing" restrictions and "opt-in" disclosure
requirements are in clear conflict with the GLB Act's overarching goal
of facilitating the efficient and open sharing of consumer information
throughout the financial services industry. Proponents of these state
statutes argue that the statutes operate effectively to supplement the
GLB Act, bv providing consumers with greater privacv protections
and a better understanding of the actual purpose of notice and
disclosure reauirements. 14 1 Opponents, on the other hand, argue that
Congress expressly chose to use "opt-out" language to provide for an
effective sharing of more information.
The United States' financial privacv framework will continue to
evolve in response to external forces throughout the world. Although
the United States p~lainlv values the free flow of information and the
rewards that come from these op~en channels, it remains unclear how
far states will go in restricting that flow of information out of the
necessity to protect their citizens' personal financial privacy.
III. THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT & FAIR AND ACCURATE CREDIT
TRANSACTION ACTS
A. INTRODUCTION
The Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") was enacted in 1970142
and was the first significant effort to address personal privacy on the
federal level. It provides consumers with protection from incorrect
and inappropriate disclosures of personal information from consumer
reporting agencies. 4 3  Congress's goal in passing the FCRA was to
141 Id. at 367.
142 Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 601, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128 - 1136 (1970)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 - 1681t).
143 Partnership to Protect Consumer Credit, Fair Credit Reporting Act Summary, at
http://www.protectconsumercredit.org/legislative/updates.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
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require credit bureaus and similar organizations to adopt reasonable
procedures that balance the need for information in the commercial
context with the necessity of protecting consumer privacy.
144
Specifically, the congressional purpose in passing the FCRA was "to
insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave
responsibilities with fairness impartiality, and a respect for the
consumer's right to privacy."' 5 The primary focus of the FCRA is to
ensure fair and accurate information in credit and other reports on
consumers. Credit reporting agencies ("CRAs") collect information
on consumers' creditworthiness based on public records, information
from financial institutions and other sources that total over two billion
transactions per month.146 Millions of businesses rely on the. reports
from these agencies to provide services and products to more than 180
million consumers. 
147
The FCRA requires CRAs to disclose personal credit information
under limited circumstances and to follow reasonable procedures for
the collection and maintenance of credit and similar data, 148 and ?ives
customers the right to correct inaccurate information in their files. It
also allows consumers to have summaries of their disputes with these
agencies and updated information included with their credit reports.150
However, "in exchange for these rights and obligations, the FCRA
restricts the rights of consumers to sue under state law governing
defamation, negligence, and invasion of privacy for inaccuracies in
these reports and in information that organizations provide to credit
bureaus and other consumer reporting agencies."'15
1
In 1996 the Act was substantially modified to clarify obligations of
reporting agencies, and to create new obligations on existing
'44 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
145 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4).
146 Partnership to Protect Consumer Credit, supra note 143.
147 Id.
148 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b, 1681c, 1681e(b), 1681k, 168111, 1681m.
141 15 U.S.C. §§ 16811i, 1681s-2.
SO 15 U.S.C. § 16811i(b).
151 L. Richard Fischer, Fair Credit Reporting Act, THE LAW OF FINANcIAL PRIVACY, 1.01
(A.S. Pratt & Sons 2004); see 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e).
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organizations that furnish information to these agencies. 152 The
revision also established the FCRA as the uniform national standard
and preempted all applicable corresponding state laws.' 53 In summary,
the FCRA restricts dissemination of consumer reports for certain
"permissible purposes," as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b, and
otherwise prohibits disclosure of consumer information by consumer
reporting agencies, and attempts to prevent the distribution of
information that may be either obsolete or inaccurate. 154 The 1996
Amendments also included a sunset provision "to prompt
Congressional review of the impact of the... amendments after such
time that the full range of their effects on credit markets could be
comprehensively evaluated."' 155  The sunset provision expired on
January 1, 2004. 156
Partially in response to the expiration of the 1996 Amendment
provisions, the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003,
("FACT Act"), was signed into law on December 4, 2003.157 It
permanently reauthorized the national uniformity provisions of the
FCRA and strengthened the national credit reporting system, in an
effort to protect consumers and financial institutions against identity
theft. The FACT Act's purpose was to create a uniform national
standard to enhance and govern the development of a national
recording system. 15  President Bush's office proclaimed, "the
legislation will provide consumers, companies, consumer reporting
agencies, and regulators with important new tools that expand access
to credit and other financial services for all Americans, enhance the
accuracy of consumers' financial information, and help fight identity
theft."' 9 Specifically, "the overwhelming votes by which the House
and Senate bills and the final FACT Act was passed, combined with
152 Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 1401-1420, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-426-3009-454 (1996).
'5 15 U.S.C. § 1681t.
114 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681c, 1681e(b).
... S. REP. No. 108-166 at 6 (2003).
156 15 U.S.C. § 168 1t(d)(2)(A).
... Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003).
158 S. REP. No. 108-166 at 6 (2003).
159 Fact Sheet: President Bush Signs the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/print/20031204-3.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2005).
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the significant support that each bill received by both parties in
Congress, was demonstrative of a legislative process characterized by
a 'bipartisan, bicameral effort' and was reflective of the priority and
the urgency that Congress placed on amending the FCRA."'
160
Ultimately, the support for the FACT Act has been wide-ranging.
161
The FCRA was designed to help prevent identity theft, and to that
end Congress looked at several widely reported surveys including a
September 2003 report by the FTC, which estimated that nearly ten
million people were victims of identity theft in 2002.162 The FACT
Act allows for free annual consumer credit reports, 163 an improved
accuracy standard for information that is furnished to credit reporting
agencies,164 and access to credit scores from credit reporting agencies
for a reasonable fee. 165  The statute includes multiple measures to
prevent identity theft, including a duty of creditors to take
precautionary steps if a fraud alert is in a credit file or accompanies a
credit score before granting credit.' 66  Commentators note, however,
that while Congress responded to the prevalence of identity theft and
the importance of accuracy of consumer credit files with the FACT
Act, it is not a comprehensive solution to identity theft, and "Congress
left much work for states to do."' 167 States have found it challenging to
16o Fischer, supra note 151, at 1.01.
161 See Jill Schachner Chanen, Consumer Complaints, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2004, 51.
162 Federal Trade Commission, Identity Theft Survey Report, September 2003, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2005). The survey
found that 27.3 million Americans have been victims of identity theft from 1998-2002,
including 9.91 million people or 4.6% of the population in 2002 and that 52% of all ID theft
victims, approximately 5 million people in 2002, discovered that they were victims of identity
theft by monitoring their accounts. On January 26, 2005, the Better Business Bureau released
its Identity Theft Survey as an update to the FTC 2003 report. Available at
http://www.javelinstrategy.com/reports/20051dentityFraudSurveyReport.html (last visited Feb.
19, 2005). It found that in 2004, 9.3 million Americans were victims of identity theft and that
the total annual identity fraud when adjusted for inflation remains essentially unchanged.
163 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 211, 117 Stat.
1952 (2003).
164 iId
165 Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act § 212(e).
166 Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act § I 11.
167 Hillebrand, Gail. After the FACTA: State Power to Prevent Identity Theft. 17 LoY.
CONSUMER L. REv. 53, 58 (2004).
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reconcile the provisions in the FACT Act with their own protection
statutes.
B. FCRA, THE FACT ACT, AND PREEMPTION FOR IDENTITY THEFT
The general rule under the FCRA favors non-preemption in the
absence of inconsistencies with provisions of the federal Act. 68 To
clarify the general language in the FCRA, the FACT Act qualifies
preemption as pertaining to laws "for the prevention or mitigation of
identity theft." 69 As such, state laws regarding identity theft are
preempted by the FCRA only when they are inconsistent with a
provision of the FCRA. The legislative history is clear on this issue,
and the Oxley-Bachus' 70 legislative history notes that "no state or local
jurisdiction, may add to, alter or affect the rules established by statute
or regulations thereunder in any of these... areas," and explicitly states
that the federal preemption provision regarding identity theft is
governed "solely by federal law and any State action that attempts to
impose requirements or prohibitions in these areas would be
preempted., 171  Although the FACT Act permanently extends the
seven areas of preemption that were added in the 1996
Amendments, 172 "national consumer organizations have called this a
168 Fair Credit Reporting Act § 625(a).
169 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act § 711(1) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a)
(2004)).
170 The "Section-by-Section Summary of H.R. 2622" submitted by Representative Michael
Oxley, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, and Representative Spenser
Bachus, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit is
refered to as the Oxley-Bachus report or the Oxley-Bachus legislative history. See The Fact
Act Compliance Manual, available at http://www.sheshunoff.com/store/media/pdf/
h87_htu.pdf (last visited May 14, 2005).
171 Fischer, supra note 161, at 1.10[2][c]; see 149 CONG. REC. E2519 (daily ed. Dec. 8,
2003).
172 Six of the seven of these preemptions apply "with respect to any subject matter regulated
under" listed sections or subsections. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act § 711(3)
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(l) (2004)). These are § 1681b (prescreening of consumer
reports), § 1681 i (how long a consumer reporting agency must take action related to disputed
information in a customer's file), § 168 1m(a,b) (duties of a person who takes adverse action
with a consumer), § 168 1m(d) (duties of those who use consumer reports in connection with
credit or insurance transactions not initiated by consumer that result in a firm offer of credit or
insurance), § 1681 c (information contained in consumer reports), § 1681 s-2 (responsibilities
of persons who furnish information to credit reporting agencies). The seventh, FCRA
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major loss for consumers because federal preemption systems stymie
the development of new consumer rotections to respond to both old
and new credit related problems."' 7 Additionally, the FACT Act adds
three sections to the "subject matter regulated under" form of the
FCRA preemption. 1
74
The first is § 609(a), which requires a business that provided an
identity thief credit, products, or services, to provide the victim of the
identity theft with copies of an application and the reasonably
available business transaction records within its control.175  In the
absence of support from law enforcement agencies, which are often
unresponsive to these frequently low-dollar amount claims, those who
have fallen victim to identity theft must often investigate themselves,
and one can use the information provided under this provision to help
stop the identity thieves. Because § 609(a) falls under the "subject
matter regulated under" preemption provision, states are limited in
their ability to enact laws in this area. "For example, state laws that
shorten the 30 day time period or provide for an alternative way to
trigger the riht to receive this information are highly likely to be
preempted."' But, state laws that lprovide greater consumer
protections are not likely to be preempted.
17
Secondly, the FACT Act adds § 624 to the FCRA, which states
that unless a consumer is given a chance to opt-out, the exchange and
use of a consumer's information to make a solicitation for marketing
purposes is prohibited. 178  But, the "subject matter regulated under"
preemption describes the subject matter as "relating to the exchange
and use of information to make a solicitation for marketing
purposes,"'179 and the description is broader than the subject matter of
§ 624(b)(2), renumbered § 625(b)(2), is not included under the "subject matter regulated
under" language.
173 Hillebrand, supra note 167, at 59.
174 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act § 151 (a)(2) (amending 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681 t(b)(1)(G)-(I) (2004)) (citing Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act §§ 214(c)(2),
311 (b)).
175 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act § 151(a) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1681t (2004).
176 Hillebrand, supra note 167, at 63.
171 Id. at 81-82.
178 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act § 214. The language only regulates use of
information for marketing purposes, but does not regulate the sharing of information.
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the section, resulting in some confusion. "Such preemption should
extend, at the most, to state laws imposing conditions or restrictions on
the use of personal financial information obtained from an affiliate for
marketing solicitations and not for other purposes, such as credit or
insurance underwriting. ' 180  Ultimately, the scope of any new
preemption of state affiliate sharing laws is not entirely clear.
The third portion of the FCRA that was added to the "subject
matter regulated under" preemptions is § 615(h), which relates "to the
duties of users to provide notice with respect to terms in certain credit
transactions. 1 81 This section requires notice to the consumer when,
based on a consumer report, the terms offered are materially less
favorable than the most favorable terms available to a "substantial
proportion" of consumers via that lender or broker. 182 This part was
included because information in a consumer's credit file could lead to
the consumer being offered less favorable credit terms, yet lenders
claimed that they were not obligated to give a notice of adverse action.
"The risk-based pricing notice is essentially a counterpart to the notice
of adverse action, a type of notice for which state laws were already
preempted under FCRA."' 183 As such, applying the "subject matter
regulated under" preemption to the risk-based pricing notice preempts
state law in an area where the 1996 amendments have effectively
prevented the states from acting. 
184
C. THE FACT ACT STANDALONE PREEMPTION SECTIONS: CREDIT
SCORE DISCLOSURE & ANNUAL FREE REPORTS
Having good credit is increasingly important to Americans, but a
2004 study from the Consumer Federation of America found that
"most consumers do not understand the meaning of credit scores, their
importance, how to obtain them, and how to improve them."
'1 85
180 Hillebrand, supra note 167, at 64.
181 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act § 311 (a).
182 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act § 311.
183 Hillebrand, supra note 167, at 66.
184id.
185 Consumer Federation of America, Most Consumers do not Understand Credit Scores
According to a New Comprehensive Survey, available at http://www.consumerfed.org/
092104creditscores.PDF (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
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Specifically, only about 34% understand that credit scores indicate the
risk of not repaying a loan as opposed to factors such as financial
resources or consumer credit knowledge.' 8 6 The study found that few
consumers even know what constitutes a good score, and many have
no clear idea of how they can improve their score.1 87 The credit score
preemption under the FACT Act is narrow and applies to disclosures
under § 609(b), which addresses consumer reporting agency disclosure
of credit scores for credit granting purposes, and under § 609(g),
which addresses mortgage lenders and brokers. 188  The preexisting
state credit score disclosure laws in California 189 and Colorado190 are
expressly exempted from preemption. States should remain free to
regulate disclosure of credit scores from non-home secured lenders
and with respect to issues other than disclosure. 191 "States can regulate
credit score disclosure by consumer reporting agencies when credit
scores are zenerated or used for purposes other than credit granting
purposes." 1"2 The FACT Act explicitly gives states authority over
insurance scoring. 1
93
To promote further the availability of credit reports to individuals
interested in monitoring unauthorized activity that may be the result of
identity theft, the FACT Act added § 612(a) which provides for a free
annual credit report. 194 A 2004 report from the National Association
of State Public Interest Research Groups ("PIRGs") studied the three
major credit bureaus - Experian, Equifax, and Trans Union, which
maintain files on nearly 90% of all American adults. 195 The study
186 Id.
187 id.
188 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act § 212(b) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(3)
(2004)).
189 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.10, 1785.15-1785.15.2, 1785.16, 1785.20 (West 2003).
190 COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3-106(2), 212-14.3-104.3 (2003).
191 Hillebrand, supra note 167, at 69.
192 id.
193 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act § 212(b).
194 Fair Credit Reporting Act § 612(a) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1681j(a) (2004)).
195 National Association of State PIRGs, Mistakes Do Happen: A Look at Errors in Consumer




found that "25% of the credit reports surveyed contained serious errors
that could result in the denial of credit, such as false delinquencies or
accounts that did not belong to the consumer" and that altogether
"79% of the credit reports surveyed contained either serious errors or
other mistakes of some kind."'1 6  Although preexisting laws in the
seven states that provide for free annual credit reports are exempt from
the standalone preemption in FCRA, § 625(b)(4), these laws are not
included in the "conduct required" preemption in § 625(b)(5).197 "This
suggests that the inclusion of the free annual report section on the list
of provisions which preempt as to the conduct they require is simply
an error." 198 The effect on states is uncertain and "states could impose
a similar free annual report requirement on regional consumer
reporting agencies and regional specialty agencies such as a regional
landlord-tenant database, from which § 612(a) does not require a free
annual report."'
199
D. STATE LAWS AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION
In terms of fair credit reporting laws, there is an intersection
between state statutes, common law, constitutional provisions, and
federal statutes that require financial institutions to be careful when
structuring their relationship with customers and credit reporting
agencies. "Financial institutions should be cognizant of fair credit
reporting obligations under both federal and state law whenever they
implement information interchange policies, structure their
relationships with customers or credit reporting agencies, or consider
the consequences of the interchange of information with unaffiliated
196 National Association of State PIRGs, Mistakes Do Happen: A Look at Errors in Consumer
Credit Reports Executive Summary, available at http://uspirg.org/
uspirg.asp?id2=13649&id3=USPIRG&#notes (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
197 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-14.3-105(1)(d) (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393(29)(C)
(2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 316.2 (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 14-
1209(a)(1), § 14-1209(b)(1)(i) (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 59(d)-59(e) (2004); N.J.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:11-37.10(a)(1) (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2480c(a)(1)
(2004). The Oxley-Bachus legislative history notes that only the identified state laws
governing credit score disclosure, credit-based insurance score disclosure, and the frequency
of consumer report disclosure are grandfathered. 149 CONG. REc. E2514 (daily ed. Dec 8,
2003).
198 Hillebrand, supra note 167, at 71.
199 Hillebrand, Gail. After the FACTAct: What States Can Still Do to Prevent Identity Theft,
available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/FACT-0104.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
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businesses. ' '20 Again, while there is a general deference to state laws
consistent with the governing principals of the FCRA, FTC
commentary indicates that a state law is preempted by the FCRA "only
when compliance with inconsistent state law would result in violation
of the FCRA. ',2 1 However,
[a]s a practical matter, the uncertainty engendered by
piecemeal preemption under the nebulous standard of
inconsistency may require financial institutions to comply
with both state and federal law unless compliance with both
is impracticable or there is a specific federal preemption
provision, or an administrative interpretation or judicial
decision, clearly applicable to a specific case.2 °2
Recent cases continue in the trajectory of broad FCRA preemption in
specific areas that are inside the areas covered by the statute and
federal agency regulations.
The California case American Bankers Association v. Lockyer,
discussed in the GLB Act context, supra, held that "[n]o requirement
or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State.. .with
respect to the exchange of information among persons affiliated by
common ownership or common corporate control. '20 3 The court held
that the FCRA only covered the sharing of information that constitutes
consumer reports, and explained that the "FCRA preemption provision
[did] not broadly preempt all state laws regarding sharing by affiliates,
whatever the purpose or context."20 4 This case rejected the frequently
held view by large financial institutions with hundreds and often
thousands of affiliates, that the FCRA preempts affiliate information
sharing for non-marketing solicitation purposes. 20 5
The FCRA does not preempt all state law rights. The Minnesota
case, Davenport v. Farmers Ins. Group, held that the notice provisions
required under the Minnesota Insurance Fair Information Reporting
200 Fischer, supra note 151, at 1.10[l].
201 Fischer, supra note 151, at 1.10[2][a] (citing 16 C.F.R. pt. 600, App., 622-1).
202 Id.
203 Am. Bankers Ass 'n, 2004 WL 1490432, at *6.
2041d. at *13.
205 Hillebrand, supra note 167, at 64 - 65.
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206Act ("MIFIRA") were not preempted by the FCRA. The plaintiffs
claimed on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated that
Farmers Insurance Group and others violated the MIFIRA by
collecting and disclosing personal information without first providing
notice and securing written authorization. In finding that the FCRA
did not preempt the MIFIRA, the court said, "the FCRA makes clear
that it is not intended to occupy the entire regulatory field with regard
to consumer disputes," and that "the statute plainly limits its
preemption of state regulations 'only to the extent of the
inconsistency' with those regulations. 20  The court then cited FTC
commentary that emphasized that the FCRA was not intended to
preempt the entire field of consumer report law, stating, "state law is
pre-empted by the FCRA only when compliance with inconsistent
state law would result in violation of the FCRA.,, 20 8  The Eighth
Circuit held that the MIFIRA requirement that insurance companies
notify consumers before obtaining their personal information does not
conflict with the FCRA, and that the FCRA does not preempt all state
law rights. 209
In a Michigan case, Nelski v. Ameritech, Ameritech Services, the
plaintiff was a victim of identity theft and sued defendants alleging
defamation and violation of the FCRA.. The court held that because
the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a cause of action for common-law
defamation under § 1681h(e), the trial court erred in dismissing the
claim for failure to state a cause of action. 20 After the plaintiffs
FCRA claims were removed to the federal court and resolved, the trial
court granted defendants summary disposition of the plaintiffs state
law claim. 211 The court concluded that the defendants were fumishers
of information under the FCRA and that the FCRA applied to this case
and preempted the plaintiff s state law claim.
212
206 Davenport v. Farmers Ins. Group, 378 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2004).
207 Id. at 7 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a)).
208 Id. at 8 (citing 16 C.F.R. Pt. 600, App. § 622).
209 Nelski v. Ameritech, Ameritech Servs., Inc., No. 244644, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 1798
(Mich. App. June 29, 2004).
211 Id. at *18.
211 Id. at *1.
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The court cited § 1618h(e), stating that it provided qualified
immunity to fumishers of information, including the defendants,
"except as to false information furnished with malice or willful intent
to injure such consumer." 213  The plaintiff alleged that the
"[d]efendants acted in a libelous, slanderous[,] and defamatory manner
in terms of reporting and/or publishing false financial records." 214 She
further alleged that she "was declined credit from two separate
companies due to negligent reporting/publishing and/or willful and
wanton disregard as to reporting/publishing by Defendants of
Plaintiffs financial record.",2 5 The Court held that the plaintiff
sufficiently alleged a cause of action for common-law defamation
under § 1681h(e).216 However, Judge White in a concurring opinion
said that "on this record, it is unclear plaintiff can sustain an action
under 15 U.S.C. § 1681(h)" and noted that the parties should address
the issue on remand.21 7
Although no federal court of appeals has addressed the issue of
preemption of state law tort claims accompanying a claim under the
FCRA, the court in Maim v. Household Bank attempted to reconcile
what it saw as two overlapping sections that restricted state law claims
against furnishers. 218  The original FCRA preemption, § 1681h(e),
limited liability for defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence to
instances where "false information [was] furnished with malice or
willful intent to injure... [the] consumer." Plaintiffs who show that
information was provided with "knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not" could bring claims
under it.2
19
At the same time, the second preemption requirement in the 1996
amendments stated "no requirement of prohibition may be imposed
under the laws of any State with respect to any subject matter
regulated under... section 1681 s-2 of this title, relating to the
213 Id. at *18 (citing § 1681h(e)).
214 Nelski, Mich. App. LEXIS 1798, at *18.
2 15 id
216/id.
2 17 Id. at *19 (White, J., dissenting).
218 Maim v. Household Bank, N.A., Civil No. 03-4340, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12981, at *15
(D. Minn., 2004).
219 Id. at *16 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e)).
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responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer
reporting agencies." 220  The Maim court held that, "because §
1681t(b)(1)(F) precludes imposition of any state law on matters
regulated under § 1681s-2, the FCRA preempts state tort actions
premised on a furnisher's post-notice conduct."22 1  The Minnesota
court regarded § 1681t(b)(1)(F), which was added to the FCRA after §
1681 g, as completely subsuming § 1681 h(e).
In contrast, a second approach, as represented by the Alabama case
McCloud v. Homeside Lending, is that § 1681t(b)(1)(F) does not
preempt common law tort claims and that it applies to state statutes
only, with § 1681h(3) pertaining to common law torts.222  This is
referred to as the "minority view,"223 although the distinction between
the minority and majority view is somewhat precarious since "the most
recent cases appear to indicate that the so-called minority
rule is on the verge of gaining majority status. 224 Courts are reluctant
to adopt a single majority or minority view, preferring instead to look
at the reasoning of the various options.
225
A third approach is called the temporal approach. Under this
approach,
there are two distinct time frames that are relevant to an
analysis under the FCRA with respect to fumisher liability
under state common law: (1) before the fumisher is notified
of a dispute by the consumer reporting agency; and (2) after
notification. In the first time period, according to these
courts, § 1681h(e) applies and a plaintiff may bring any
claims for defamation or negligence so long as the furnisher
had 'malice or willful intent to injure.' In the second time
period, after the furnisher has been notified of a complaint
220 Id. at * 17 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F)).
221 Id. at *22.
222 McCloud v. Homeside Lending, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1341-42 (N.D. Ala. 2004).
223 Carriere v. Proponent Federal Credit Union, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14095 (D. La. 2004).
224 McCloud, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1342.
225 Id.
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by the consumer reporting agency, § 1681 t(b)(1)(F) serves as
a total bar to state-law claims.226
This approach seems to be the most widely used at present. 227
In a Louisiana case, Carriere v. Proponent Federal Credit Union,
the plaintiff suggested a fourth approach that combined the elements of
the second and third approaches, urging that § 1681 t(b)(1)(F) preempts
all state law claims arising after a furnisher receives notice of a dispute
from a credit reporting agency.228 The Carriere court rejected creating
a fourth standard, because it was unclear whether the actions
complained of arose before or after the plaintiff received notice from
the credit reporting agency.229 Ultimately the court used the temporal
approach and recommended that the motion to dismiss for preemption
be denied, because discovery had not yet been conducted.23
E. LIMITATIONS ON THE USAGE OF CONSUMER REPORTS
The 2003 case Hasburn v. County of Los Angeles dealt with
obtaining a consumer report to collect child support payments. The
court held that "under the FCRA, a child support enforcement agency
may obtain the consumer credit report of a person owing or potentially
owing child support. ' 231  The plaintiff, a delinquent child support
obligor, claimed that the Bureau of Family Support Operations
obtained the plaintiff's credit report in violation of the FCRA, and that
226 Carlson v. Trans Union, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 2d 517, 521 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (citing Vazquez-
Garcia v. Trans Union De P.R., Inc., 222 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.P.R., 2002) & Aklagi v.
Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (D. Kan., 2002)); see also Carriere,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14095 at *13; see Bank One, N.A. v. Colley, 294 F. Supp. 2d 864, 868
(N.D. La. 2003).
227 See Jeffery v. Trans Union, LLC, 273 F. Supp. 2d 725, 726 (D. Va. 2003); Woltersdorf v.
Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225-27 & nn.5-6 (N.D. Ala. 2004);
Harrison v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS *3 (D. Conn., 2005).
228 Carriere, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14095, at *14; see Stafford v. Cross Country Bank, 262
F. Supp. 2d 776, 786-788 (W.D. Ky. 2003).
229 Carriere, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14095, at *17.
230 Carriere, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14095, at *17; see Woltersdorf v. Pentagon Federal
Credit Union, CIV-03-H-2820-S, 2004 WL 1252689, at *4 (N.D. Ala. April 2, 2004) (holding
that defendant could move forward with a motion for summary judgment once it could
produce evidence supporting its preemption argument.).
231 Hasburn v. County of Los Angeles, 323 F.3d 801, 805 (9th Cir. 2003).
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the child protection agency failed to comply with certification
requirements, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 168lb(a)(4).232 The court
held that when requesting a consumer credit report to establish one's
ability to pay support or to determine the appropriate amount, the child
support enforcement agency must comply with § 168lb(1)(4).233
However, when the agency seeks to enforce an existing order of child
support, the certification requirements of § 168lb(a)(4) are
inapplicable. 2 34 Cases like this show the breadth of the FCRA and
how the 1996 Amendments expand the permissible purposes under
which one can obtain a consumer report.
An additional issue is what constitutes a firm offer of credit.235 In
2003, a Louisiana case, Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank, held that
because the "FCRA ha[d] been manipulated such that a 'firm offer'
really means a 'firm offer if you meet certain criteria,' plaintiffs
allegations [sic] do not amount to a violation of the FCRA, but merely
evidence a dissatisfaction with this prescreening process." 236  The
plaintiff received a pre-qualified offer for a credit card from the
defendant bank, and believing that she was pre-aproved for credit,
she accepted the offer and returned the application. Upon receiving
the application, the bank obtained her credit report and notified her
that she could not open an account based on the information contained
in her credit report. 8 The plaintiff alleged that the bank had obtained
her credit report without her consent or knowledge, and that the bank
had an obligation to make a firm offer of credit and honor that offer.239
The bank argued that it had a legal right to decline credit to a
232 Id. at 802.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 The FCRA defines "firm offer of credit or insurance" as "any offer of credit or insurance to
a consumer that will be honored if the consumer is determined, based on information in a
consumer report on the consumer, to meet the specific criteria used to select the consumer for
the offer...." 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(l).
236 Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank, Civil Action No. 03-0050 Section M, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8454, at *6 (E.D. La. May 20, 2003).
237 Id. at *2.
238 Id
239 Id. at *3.
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consumer who did not satisfy its credit criteria. 240 The district court
held that a firm offer may "be conditioned on the consumer being
determined to meet specific criteria bearing on credit worthiness that is
established before selection of the consumer and for the purpose of
determining whether to extend credit."24 1 The Louisiana court held
that to the extent the plaintiff had alleged violations of state laws,
those laws were expressly preempted by § 1681 t(a) of the FCRA and
her case was dismissed.24
On appeal, the plaintiff maintained that her complaint stated a
cause of action, and that the district court was incorrect in dismissing
it. The plaintiff argued that the FCRA
[p]ermits a bank to obtain a consumer credit report for the
purpose of extending a firm offer of credit, but may decline
credit for only three reasons: (1) because of information
contained in the consumer's credit application, (2) because
of verification of the information used to select the consumer
for the offer, and/or (3) because the consumer fails to
provide collateral.243
The plaintiff insisted that the bank used other criteria when declining
her credit. The appeals court noted that because the plaintiff
responded to the pre-approved credit offer, the creditor was allowed to
access the credit report to determine whether the plaintiff still satisfied
the previously-established credit worthiness criteria.2 "
Additionally, the plaintiff argued that the bank violated sections
1681 a(l) and 1681 b(c) by declining to extend credit after extending
firm offers of credit. The court said in response that the FCRA
"allows a creditor to use information in a consumer report to verify a
consumer's credit worthiness, and to withdraw a firm offer of credit if
the consumer does not meet the creditor's previously-established
240 1d. at *4.
241 Kennedy, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8454, at *5.
242 Id. at *6.
243 Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank U.S., NA, 369 F.3d 833, 839 (5th Cir. 2004).
244 Id. at 838.
2451 d. at 841.
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criteria for extending credit."246 The plaintiff authorized the banks to
obtain a consumer report for issuing a credit card account, and the
bank could' withdraw the offer if the plaintiff was not credit worthy
based on the consumer reports.
The plaintiff also argued that the bank violated the FCRA by
obtaining credit information under false pretenses, in violation of
FCRA § 1681q, which provides a cause of action for obtaining credit
information under false pretenses. 247 The court dismissed this cause of
action, because the bank fully apprised the plaintiff that it would
review her credit history prior to determining whether to extend the
offered credit.248  When the plaintiff signed the pre-approved
certificates, she agreed to the terms of the offers and authorized the
bank to access her credit information. 249 The Fifth Circuit held that
the district court did not err, and that in absence of an allegation of
inaccurate information there was no claim. 25  On November 15, 2004
a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit was denied by the Supreme Court.
251
F. OBLIGATIONS OF USERS OF CONSUMER REPORTS
A Pennsylvania case, Crane v. American Home Mortgage Corp.,
addressed the obligations of those who use the credit information
contained in consumer reports. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
was using consumer credit information in violation of the FCRA, and
brought the action on behalf of himself and others who sought
mortgage loans from the defendant bank and were approved subject to
payment of higher interest rates, fees, or other unfavorable terms.
2 52
The plaintiff believed that the denial of pre-qualification at the
defendant's prime rate was an adverse action under the FCRA §
246 Id. at 841-42; see 15 U.S.C. § 168 la(1)(2).
247 Kennedy, 369 F.3d at 842; see 15 U.S.C. § 1681q.
248 Kennedy, 369 F.3d at 844.
249 Id. at 843.
250 id.
251 Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, NA, 125 S. Ct. 508 (2004).
252 Crane v. American Home Mortgage, Corp., No. 03-5784, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12770, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2004).
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1681n, and the defendant was required to comply with the FCRA's
notice provisions. 2 53  The defendant moved for summary judgment,
claiming that he had not taken an adverse action against the plaintiff
because the plaintiff initiated the pre-qualification process without
following up on his initial inquiry. 54 The defendant further argued
that a formal credit application was required to trigger consumer
protections under the FCRA, while the plaintiff argued that the
transaction was enouP5, because the FCRA does not require a formal
application for credit. 
5
The court looked to the definition of adverse action in the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA") and defined adverse action as "a
denial or revocation of credit, a change in the terms of an existing
credit arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit in substantially the
amount or on substantially the terms requested., 256 The court held that
the language of the FCRA provision was clear and that Congress
intended a broader definition of "adverse action" in the FCRA than in
the ECOA. 257  "The FCRA notice requirements are intended to cover
adverse actions 'made in connection with an application' or 'a
transaction that was initiated by ... any consumer."' 258  After
considering that the FCRA was enacted to protect consumers from
transmission of inaccurate consumer information, the Pennsylvania
court found it unlikely that Congress intended pre-qualification
processes to fall outside of the Act's protection, and read a broad
definition of "adverse action" in the FCRA.259
253 Id. at *8.
254 Id. at *12.
255 Id.
256 Id. at *14 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6)); see ECOA 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c)(1)(i)(2004).
257 Crane, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12770, at *17.
258 Id. The Court also cited several other 2004 cases to support that "the FCRA defines
'adverse action' more broadly than does the ECOA," Treadway v. Gateway Chevrolet
Oldsmobile, Inc., 362 F.3d 971, 982-83 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Payne v. Ken Diepholz Ford
Mercury, No. 02-C-1329, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Jan 6, 2004) (applying
the catch-all provision to auto financing transactions).
259 Id. at *21.
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G. CASES IN INVOLVING THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS
Several recent cases have helped bolster the protections that
consumers receive under the FCRA. Nelson v. Chase Manhattan
Mortgage Corp held that the FCRA gave consumers a private cause of
action against providers of credit information, because the primary
purpose of the FCRA was to protect consumers against inaccurate and
incomplete credit reporting.26P A recent article notes that post-Nelson,
"the liability has ratcheted way up... it used to be only the credit
bureaus... now the liability is anyone involved in the loop between the
credit bureaus - the information furnishers and anyone else obtaining
the information.",261 A recent key case was Johnson v. MBNA, which
held that those who furnish credit information had a duty to investigate
consumer complaints about incorrect information. 262  The plaintiff
sued a credit card issuer to challenge its contention that she was
responsible for the balance on a credit card that was in the name of her
263former husband. She claimed that she had no knowledge of the
card, had not applied for it as a co-obligor, and had not used it.264 The
Fourth Circuit used the balancing test employed by the district court
and held that "weighing the cost of verifying disputed information
against the possible harm to the consumer - logically applies in
determining whether the steps taken (and not taken) by a creditor in
investigating a dispute constitute a reasonable investigation." 265 This
test toughens the standard and credit information furnishers may need
to consult underlying documents such as account applications, rather
than simply relying on data in computerized customer information
systems. 66  Courts are forcing credit providers to become more
diligent in following up on consumer complaints.267
260 Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002).
261 Chanen, supra note 161, at 53.
262 Johnson v. MBNA America Bank, 357 F.3d 426, 433 (4th Cir. 2004).
263 Id. at 428-29.
264 id.
265 Id. at 432-33.
266 Id. at 431.
267 The Chanen article quotes Leonard Bennett, who represented the plaintiff at the trial court
level, stating "almost all creditors that investigate what they report to credit bureaus do a very
superficial computer check.. .Johnson held that the creditors have to go back to the original
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By holding that § 1681-2(b)(1) compels furnishers "to conduct a
reasonable investigation of their records to determine whether the
disputed information can be verified" only after adequate notice, the
Johnson decision forced credit providers to do a more thorough job in
researching complaints.26 8 Maim v. Household Bank, the Minnesota
case discussed earlier in the State Laws and Federal Preemption
section, clarified the Johnson standard and held that an unclear form
did not notify Sherman Financial Group that additional inquiry was
necessary; Sherman had not reviewed the actual application. The
court held, "while specific notice of Plaintiffs concerns could have
compelled Sherman to conduct a more thorough review, thus creating
an issue of 'reasonableness' for the jury, a more rigorous investigation
was not required here based on the superficial notice that Trans Union
provided." 7  While there is a duty to investigate, that duty has
limitations.
H. ENFORCEMENT ISSUES
Courts typically review the actions of the employer and not the
employee when making decisions regarding liability under the FCRA,
and one issue is whether an employer can be held liable under the
FCRA when an employee, acting outside of the scope of his
employment, obtains a credit report for his own personal purposes.
While an employee is liable when he or she obtains a consumer report
under false pretenses, 271 it is less clear if an employer should also be
exposed to liability. In Mississippi, Smith v. Sears Roebuck focused
on the actions of the employer rather than the employee and held that
[d]espite an employer's best efforts to ensure compliance
with the FCRA, the employer is subject to liability for the
actions of any rouge [sic] employee who might manage to
obtain a credit report for his own personal reasons - which is
documents. It seems somewhat self-evident, but that was not what the practice was." Chanen,
supra note 161, at 53.
268 Johnson v. MBNA America Bank, 357 F.3d at 431.
269 Maim v. Household Bank, N.A., Civil No. 03-4340, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12981, at *15
(D. Minn. July 7, 2004).
270 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)).
271 15 U.S.C. § 1681q.
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to say, short of implementing foolproof compliance
procedures, there is nothing an employer can do to avoid
liability.272
The plaintiff in this case sued his ex-wife's employer for not
preventing her from accessing his credit report. The court explained
that the FCRA does not impose strict liability for consumer reporting
agencies and that users such as the defendant should not be held to a
higher standard than the reporting agencies themselves.
273
Several 2004 cases applied the Sears decision, including the
Pennsylvania decision Lukens v. Dunphry Nissan, which found a
dealership to be a "person" as defined by § 1681a(b) and as such
subject to liability under the FCRA.2 74 The court cited Smith and
applied agency principles to the plaintiffs FCRA claims. 275  The
combined elements of the defendant's disregard for Williams' relevant
criminal history, the access to consumer credit information that the
defendant provided to a known identity thief, and the eventual leak of
the plaintiffs information invoked employer liability.276 Additionally,
the Kansas case Cole v. American Family Insurance struggled with the
issues of agency and relation, and concluded that the rule had not been
fully developed either in Kansas or within the Tenth Circuit, except in
Title VII employment discrimination cases.277 The court held that the
issue of vicarious liability could not be properly considered in a
motion to dismiss, and that it should be raised in a summary judgment
where the "the parties should address whether apparent authority or
aided-in-the-agency-relation rule is the correct theory of agency
liability in this case; whether an affirmative defense exists to the
chosen vicarious liability theorg- and, whether the affirmative defense
is applicable in this context. These cases illustrate the difficulty
272 Smith v. Sears Roebuck & Co., Civil No. 3:01-CV-675LN, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14189,
at *17 (S.D. Miss. May 30, 2003).
273 Id. at *18.
274 Lukens v. Dunphy Nissan, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14528 (D. Pa. July 23, 2004).
271 Id. at *12.
271 Id. at *13.
277 Cole v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1046 (D. Kan. 2004).
171/d. at 1046-47.
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that courts have when fashioning standards for vicarious liability under
the FCRA.
I. FCRA, FACT, AND THE FUTURE
While implementation may require some work and operational
adjustments from parties such as lenders, the new consumer protection
requirements within the FCRA are overall extremely positive for the
financial services sector. By giving the federal government permanent
preemption over FCRA-type rules at the state level, the FACT Act
establishes minimum uniform consumer protection standards at the
national level. This protection is valuable because, "without that,
industry entities might be forced to deal with a patchwork quilt of
various laws across states, cost of credit would rise and consumers
might have fewer credit products to choose from. ''279 The free credit
reports provision, which allows a free credit report annually from the
major CRAs, has been widely publicized and is perhaps the most
visible portion of the FACT Act.
State laws addressing identity theft are preempted by the FCRA
only when they are inconsistent with a provision of the FCRA, and
state laws that provide greater consumer protections are not likely to
be prohibited. Case law confirms a pattern of broad FCRA preemption
in specific areas addressed by statute and federal agency regulations,
while state laws that provide greater protections are being upheld. The
FCRA covers broad territory, and future cases will continue to expand
and define the permissible purposes of obtaining a consumer report
and who can obtain them. Future developments will also focus on
defining a firm offer of credit within the FCRA.
Another area that will be developed involves the correction of
errors on reports and establishing the limitations on the protections that
consumers receive under the FCRA. One trend is expanding liability
to include more information furnishers, and generally holding those
who furnish credit information responsible for investigating consumer
complaints regarding incorrect information. Courts are looking to the
consumer protection theme of the FCRA and are forcing credit
providers to be more diligent in addressing consumer complaints.
However, courts are currently struggling with creating standards for
vicarious liability under the FCRA and defining when an employer
should be exposed to liability due to the actions of its employee.
279 Karlene Bowen, FACTA: Pointing the Industry in a Good Direction, available at
http://www.fairisaac.com/Fairisaac/News/ViewPoints/200405/FACTA+Pointing+the+industry
+in+a+good+direction.htm (last visited April 3, 2005).
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IV. MONEY LAUNDERING AND SECTION 326 OF THE
USA PATRIOT ACT
A. BACKGROUND
In an immediate response to the terrorists' attacks on September
11, 2001, the U.S. Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act. The
USA PATRIOT Act gives U.S. federal officials greater authority to
track and intercept communications, and vests regulatory powers in the
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury to combat money laundering
domestically and abroad.281 Section 326 specifically states that the
Secretary of the Treasury has the power to issue regulations for
financial institutions and to recommend means to verify effectively the
identification of foreign customers. 282  Section 326 requires that
financial institutions adopt formal anti-money laundering policies with




During 2003 and throughout 2004, the Department of the Treasury
and the Department of Justice focused on three overarching goals in
implementing the USA PATRIOT Act: (1) safeguarding the
international financial system from money laundering and terrorist
financing; (2) enhancing the U.S. government's ability to identify,
investigate, and prosecute major money laundering organizations; and
(3) ensuring effective regulation. 284  Acting on its goals, the
280 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
281 See Raymond L. Moss, et. al, The U.S. Patriot Act and Related Domestic and International
Anti-Money Laundering Regulations, with a Special Focus on Switzerland: Legal and
Business Implications, 1440 PLI/CoRP 801, 805 (2004).
282 See id. at 808 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 53180) (2001)).
283 See id. at 809 (citing Security and Exchange Commission, Release No. 34-47752, File No.
S7-25-02 (effective June 9, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-47752.htm
(last viewed Feb. 16, 2005)).
284 Edward J. Krauland and Aaron R. Hutman, International Legal Developments in Review:
2003: Public International Law, 38 INT'L LAW 509, 510 (2004) (citing United States
Department of Treasury and United States Department of Justice, 2003 National Money
Laundering Strategy, (2003), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/
js10102.pdf(last viewed Feb. 16, 2005)); see also United States Department of the Treasury,
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Department of the Treasury, through the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") and the SEC, jointly adopted a
final rule to implement § 326 of the USA PATRIOT Act.285 The final
rule requires that brokers or dealers
implement reasonable procedures to "verify the identity of
any person seeking to open an account, to the extent
reasonable and practicable; to maintain records of the
information used to verify the person's identity; and to
determine whether the person appears on any lists of known
or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations provided to
brokers or dealers by any government agency. '2 86
The final rule also requires that the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Securities and Exchange Commission prescribe further regulations for




There are numerous governmental agencies and organizations
involved in enforcing regulations throughout the world. Three
important organizations operate through the U.S. Department of the
Treasury: (1) FinCEN, which works with other U.S. law enforcement
agencies to enforce federal statutes; (2) the Office of Foreign Assets
Control, which works to disrupt and freeze global terrorist financing;
and (3) "Operation Green Quest," an inter-agency enforcement
group. 2 8 8 In the international community, the Financial Action Task
FY2004 Performance and Accountability Report, at 65-77 (2004), available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/management/dcfo/accountability-reports/2004reports/
part2.pdfIMAGE.X=0\&IMAGE.Y=0 (last viewed Feb. 16, 2005).
285 Security and Exchange Commission, Release No. 34-47752, File No. S7-25-02 (effective
June 9, 2003).
286 Id.
287 Id.; see also 31 U.S.C. § 5318(1) (2001) (provides an initial framework for Secretary's
powers under Act).
288 Walter Perkel, Money Laundering and Terrorism: Informal Value Transfer Systems, 41
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 183, 186 (Winter 2004) (citing The Administration's National Money
Laundering Strategy for 2002, Testimony before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
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Force ("FATF"), 289 is tackling international money laundering by
requiring nations to enact legislation that imitates U.S. money
laundering regulations. Internationally, the U.S. is also working with
the United Nations, the World Bank/IMF, and the Egmont Group.
290
Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act grants the Secretary of the
Treasury (through FinCEN) specific authority to find that a "foreign
jurisdiction, institution, class of transactions, or type of account is of
'primary money laundering concern' and to require domestic financial
institutions and financial agencies to take certain 'special measures'
against the primary money laundering concerns."291 The statute
provides procedures for selecting the imposition of specific special
measures against these institutions.292 Before declaring a foreign
financial institution as a primary money laundering concern, the
Secretary is required to consult with both the Secretary of State and the
U.S. Attorney General.293 Following a final determination that a
foreign financial institution is of "primary money laundering concern,"
FinCEN may impose special measures that include: (1) record keeping
obligations and reporting requirements; (2) collection of information
relating to beneficial ownership; (3) collection of information relating
to corresponding accounts; (4) collection of information relating to
certain payable-through accounts; and (5) prohibition or conditions on
the opening or maintaining of correspondent or payable-through
accounts.294 As for the effect of the measures on those operating in
the United States, FinCEN typically requires that all U.S. persons,
Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2002) (Statement of Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy of Treasury, U.S.
Dep't of Treasury)).
289 See id (FATF is an international organization created by the members of G-8 and is the
investigative branch of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).
29
1 Id. at 187.
291 Federal Crimes Enforcement Network, 69 Fed. Reg. 28098 (May 18, 2004), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/31 syrianprm.pdf (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
292 Id.
293 See id. (during these discussions relevant factors for consideration include: (1) extent to
which financial institution is used to facilitate money laundering, (2) extent to which financial
institution is used for legitimate business purposes, and (3) extent to which classifying the
institution as a "primary concern" is sufficient to ensure that the purposes of the Bank Secrecy
Act is fulfilled).
294 Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(b)(l)-(5)).
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including U.S. institutions, exercise a higher level of due diligence in
complying with the various sanction programs.
295
2. SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT IN 2004
FinCEN imposed "special measures" on five separate incidents
during 2004. By imposing special measures, FinCEN labeled certain
countries and organizations as "institutions of primary money
laundering concern." These institutions were then placed on a
"blacklist" that was circulated throughout the U.S. financial industry.
Specific enforcement in 2004 includes:
1) Imposition of Special Measures against Myanmar
Mayflower Bank and Asia Wealth Bank (April 12, 2004).296
2) Imposition of a Special Measure against Commercial
Bank of Syria, including its subsidiary, Syrian Lebanese
Commercial Bank, as a Financial Institution of Primary
Money Laundering Concern (May 18, 2004).297
3) Imposition of Special Measures against Burma
(September 30, 2004).298
4) Imposition of Special Measure against Infobank as a
Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern
(September 30, 2004).299
5) Imposition of Special Measure Against First Merchant
Bank OSH Ltd, Including Its Subsidiaries, FMB Finance
295 Id.; see also Krauland, supra note 284, at 513 (discussing reporting requirements for
suspicious information).
296 See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 69 Fed. Reg. 19098 (Apr. 12, 2004), available
at http://www.fincen.gov/mayflowerbank.pdf (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
297 See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 69 Fed. Reg. 28098 (May 18, 2004), available
at http://www.fincen.gov/311 syrianprm.pdf (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
298 See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 69 Fed. Reg. 19093 (Apr. 12, 2004), available
at http://www.fincen.gov/burna.pdf (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
299 See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 69 Fed. Reg. 58375 (Sep. 30, 2004),
available at http://www.fincen.gov/311 infobankextension.pdf (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
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Ltd, First Merchant International Inc, First Merchant Finance
Ltd, and First Merchant Trust Ltd, as a Financial Institution
of Primary Money Laundering Concern (September 30,
2004).30
Each specific enforcement action is unique and contains different
requirements for financial institutions dealing with these "primary
money laundering" institutions. Financial institutions must maintain
an awareness of the current FinCEN "blacklist" and should implement
procedures and policies to comply with FinCEN's due diligence
requirements.
D. MONEY LAUNDERING, SECTION 326 OF THE
PATRIOT ACT, AND THE FUTURE
The challenges facing the United States in preventing illegal
financing are enormously complex and encompass numerous
organizations throughout the world. Current U.S. statutes appear
sufficient to regulate and monitor formal financial institutions in U.S.
and Western Europe, but struggle to maintain the same control over
the informal networks found elsewhere in the world.3 °' International
criminality and terrorist financing are a global problem and cannot be
combated effectively by any one country alone.
30 2
Looking into the future, U.S. financial institutions must continue to
be vigilant in meeting the compliance and reporting obligations
imposed under the USA PATRIOT Act. Both traditional and non-
traditional financial institutions should continually be watchful for
suspicious activity in order to protect the public and minimize their
own exposure as conduits of illegal financing activities. 303 The U.S.
must continue to strive to work with the international community to
develop and implement international rules and regulations. It is
crucial that all the financial leaders of the world continue coordinating
300 See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 69 Fed. Reg. 58374 (Sept. 30, 2004),
available at http://www.fincen.gov/31 lfmbextension.pdf (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
301 See Perkel, supra note 288, at 210 (discussing the problems inherent in monitoring
informal value transfer systems).
302 Moss et. al, supra note 281, at 830.
303 Id.
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their efforts and resources to help defeat global criminality and
terrorist financing.
304
V. HIPAA AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
In 1996 Congress passed the Health Information Portability and
Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), 30 5 which went into effect on April 14,
2003.306 It was developed to help promote a more economically
efficient electronic claim process and to protect the privacy of
individually identifiable health information. While the goals of
HIPAA are to increase privacy while decreasing costs, the rules
created by the Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to
HIPAA may in fact increase health care costs, because companies now
have more stringent standardization requirements for electronic
transactions. 30 7  Failure to meet HIPAA regulations can result in
penalties as much as $25,000 per year and per violation.3 °8 Banks are
among the many institutions that need to familiarize themselves with
the new HIPPA regulations.
A banking organization may be subject to HIPAA if it is
considered either a "health care clearinghouse," 30 9 or a "business
associate" of a "covered entity." 310 A bank may also find itself subject
to HIPPA regulation if it plays an active role in a payment system that
typically originates from insurance carriers, or payments through the
304 See id. (discussing the importance of continual cooperation among all nations).
305 Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (2000)).
306 66 Fed. Reg. 41315, 41341 (Aug. 7, 2001) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412 & 413).
307 Jessica M. Lewis, Comment: New Regulations Affecting the Banking Industry: HIPAA:
Demystifying the Implications for Financial Institutions. 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 141, 141-42
(April 2004).
308 Id.
309 A "health care clearinghouse" is defined as a: "Public or private entity...that does either of
the following functions: (1) Processes or facilitates the processing of health information... in a
nonstandard format or containing nonstandard data content into standard date elements of a
standard transaction. (2) Receives a standard transaction.. .and processes or facilitates the
processing of health information into nonstandard format or nonstandard data content for the
receiving entity." Public Welfare, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2003). A "standard transaction"
complies with the standards adopted in 45 C.F.R. § 162.103 (2003).
310 45 C.F.R. § 160.508 (2003).
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Automated Clearinghouse Network ("ACH"), which is an electronic
funds transfer system widely used by financial institutions. While
HIPAA requirements apply only to the health care components of the
bank, the bank must be sure that it does not share protected health
information used in the health care components with parts of the bank
not subject to HIPAA compliance. 311
Health care clearinghouses are intermediaries between health plans
and health care providers. The clearinghouses process claims using a
structure similar to that used by the credit card industry, although a
health care claim must be processed in compliance with HIPAA.
3 12
Once a bank is termed a health care clearing house under HIPAA, it
meets, at least partially, the covered entity and business associate
labels, which subject the bank to some degree of HIPAA
compliance.
313
HIPAA establishes only minimum federal protections, and states
can enact more stringent laws than the federal HIPAA rules on
protected health information privacy, security, and health claims
processing. 314 A state law that "relates to the privacy of individually
identifiable health information" and is "contrary to and more stringent
than the federal requirements" will control, as will state laws that the
Secretary of Health and Human Services ("HHS") deems necessary.
315
A state law is more stringent than the rules when it provides "greater
privacy protection for the individual who is the subject of the
individually identifiable health information, ' 316 while a contrary state
law is defined by the HHS as one that would be "impossible to comPlr
with" or that "stands as an obstacle" to the goals of the rules.
3
Although HIPPA rules preempt "contrary" state laws, several recent
311 Lewis, supra note 303, at 153.
312 See Richard D, Marks, Surviving Standard Transaction: A HIPAA Roadmap, 8
ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP., (BNA), 559, 561 (Jun. 4, 2003).
313 Lewis, supra note 307, at 153.
314 AHIMA Policy and Government Relations Team, Final Rule for HIPAA Security
Standards, available at http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/documents/ahima/
pubbokl_017594.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
315 Robert Woody, Health Information Privacy: The Rules Get Tougher, 37 TORT & INS. L. J.
1051, 1055 (2002).
316 Public Welfare, 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2003).
317 1d.
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cases have questioned whether a state law is more stringent than
HIPAA. In Florida, United States v. Diabetes Treatment Centers of
America held that because the state law governing medical privacy
related to matters of individually identifiable health information and
was more stringent than HIPAA, the Florida law was not preempted.318
When a financial institution processes health care payments, it may
become subject to HIPAA standards. But there is still uncertainty as
to where financial institutions fit under either the "health care
clearinghouse" definition or the "business associate" definition that
would render them accountable for compliance with HIPAA. While it
seems to be clear that, when banks explicitly contract with covered
entities to provide health care clearinghouse services, they are
subjected to HIPAA regulations, "where banks inadvertently begin to
deal with protected health information as more and more health care
payments become processed electronically, banks may validly argue
against having to increase their privacy and security standards for
those transactions." 319 However, banks accept HIPAA's dual goals of
automating and standardizing the processing of health insurance
transactions and establishing privacy and security standards that
safeguard the confidentiality of protected health information. In the
words of one group, "the banking industry's unique capability to keep
'dollars and data together' - i.e., payment-related information flowing
as addenda with the payment entry itself through the ACH Network -
is consistent with HIPAA's objective to reduce costs and simplify
administration. "320 While most large health care institutions have
faced challenges with HIPAA, financial institutions need to recognize
the privacy pressure that health care institutions face, and prepare a
strategy that balances the needs of the health care entity with the
necessity of operational flexibility on the part of the financial
institution.
321
318 United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21830 (D.D.C. May 17, 2004); see also Nat'i Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1701 (D. I11., 2004) (A government subpoena for medical records which contained a
HIPAA order for disclosure was quashed. Illinois's nonparty patient privacy laws were more
stringent and not preempted by HIPAA. Disclosure would have violated them).
319 Lewis, supra note 307, at 162-63.
320 The Banking Industry HIPAA Task Force, HIPAA and the Banking Industry, available at
http://www.hipaabanking.org/default.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
321 Kirk J. Nahra, Financial Institutions and the New HIPAA Rules, WILEY, REIN, & FIELDING





Financial privacy developments during 2004 generally focused on:
(1) the proper interpretation and application of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act to federal, state, and international law; (2) the role and
proper interpretation of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
of 2003 in supplementing the Fair Credit Recording Act; (3) protective
statutes designed to shelter U.S. citizens domestically and abroad; and
(4) the implementation and application of narrow statutes aimed at
addressing specific privacy concerns, such as the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. Central to the analysis of
these developments was the overriding importance of maintaining a
healthy balance between the need for free and open information
sharing and the importance of protecting customers' privacy rights
domestically and abroad. In balancing these competing interests,
federal financial laws have helped generate efficiencies in the financial
services industry by facilitating an open sharing of information created
by the elimination of barriers between affiliates of financial
institutions, while continuing to protect customers' privacy rights
through disclosure and notice requirements. These laws have made
the financial services industry more profitable, and have helped to
educate and inform customers as to their personal financial privacy
rights.
The financial privacy framework of the United States will continue
to evolve in response to external forces throughout the world. Recent
developments have tended to place a greater importance on the open
sharing of information in order to expand the U.S. economy and
protect the safety of American citizens, and appear to have eroded
many of the general privacy rights of individuals.
Recent enactments, such as the USA PATRIOT Act and the GLB
Act, have opened avenues for information sharing, creating more
efficient financial services domestically and further regulating the flow
of money throughout the world. On the other hand, industry-specific
statutes have been used to place greater protection on specific privacy
rights. Examples include the FACT Act, which created uniformed
national standards for credit reporting to ensure accurate information
and prevent identity theft, and HIPAA, which protects the privacy on
individual health information. In addition to federal legislation, state
legislatures have taken an active role in preventing the erosion of
individual privacy rights by enacting statutes that provide greater
protection than similar federal statutes, thereby creating preemption
issues.
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The challenges affecting the United States in allowing for the free
flow of financial information, protecting the individual privacy rights
of citizens, and preventing terrorist and other illegal financing, are
complex. U.S. financial privacy law remains a liquid medium that
continues to adapt and change in addressing these challenges.
Although the United States plainly values the free flow of information
and the rewards that come from these open channels, the future status
of financial privacy laws remain unclear, as it has yet to be determined
how effective state legislatures will be in restricting the flow of
information. It is equally unclear what role the United States will play
in the development of the world economy during the 21st century in
creating uniform international privacy standards and combating
terrorism.
